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Abstract 
 
Since the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War the scholarly debate 
about continuity and change in German foreign policy is controversial. This study 
follows the assumption of continuity in German foreign policy and chooses an 
constructivist approach to analyze the influence of domestic foreign policy norms on 
Germany‘s approach toward the three Baltic states. It is argued that regarding the Baltic 
states Germany’s continuity of Ostpolitik and Westbindung lead to different types of 
policy. With the EU and NATO membership of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 2004, 
the German approach toward the Baltic states is since then characterized by two 
competing foreign policy norms. In light of the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of 
Crimea in March 2014 by Russia, this study argues that the competing norms in German 
Baltic policy devises different responses to the increasing security concerns of the Baltic 
states. In a cross-temporal case comparison this study show how different aspects of 
German Baltic policy are carried out before and after 2014. Drawing on constructivist 
scholarship these changes are explained by a changing domestic norm prioritization that 
is captured by analyzing parliamentary debates of the German Bundedstag. By linking 
the aspects of German Baltic policy to the normative expectations of Ostpolitik and 
Westbindung based on parliamentary debates, it is suggested that prior to March 2014 
the German Baltic policy was more likely driven by the norm of Ostpolitik whereas 
after March 2014 the norm of Westbindung was prioritized. 
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Introduction 
 
After the end of the Cold War and the restoration of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian 
independence in 1991, Germany was one of the first states to renew the diplomatic 
relations with the three states. Besides the renewed relations Germany’s foreign policy 
towards the three Baltic states was during the Cold War in a difficult position which 
continued after 1991. Whereas from Baltic states perspective Germany was always of 
essential importance and a key partner in Europe up today, the German position towards 
the Baltic states was often restrained. The changes of geopolitical circumstances after 
the Cold War certainly played a significant role. It is here, however, to show that the 
German foreign policy is also guided by the delicate balance of different, at times 
competing, norms that arose from the German foreign policy principles of Ostpolitik 
and Westbindung.
1
  While this does not mean, and should not be read to imply, that 
geopolitical factors did not matter or are neglected, It is here with the constructivist 
scholarship on foreign policy and their basic claim to show that norms and ideas matter. 
In the present context, this means that the material conditions, the geopolitical changes 
put in place by the end of the Cold War become meaningful only in the way they are 
mediated through prevailing normative structures by which actors ascribe them with 
particular meaning. Already in the Cold War era the approach of the German Federal 
Government to deal with Baltic states was influenced on one hand by the juridical non-
recognition of the annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union in 1944, but on 
the other hand was in light of the systemic conflict and the division of Germany and 
whole Europe de facto treated as part of the USSR.
2
 The approach taken after 1991 
towards the Baltic states from geopolitical perspective should have shown clear position 
but the academic discussion about Germany’s continuity and change in foreign policy 
                                                          
1
Ostpolitik means Germany’s foreign policy towards Eastern European countries including Russia. 
Westbindung refers to Germany’s western integration and policy within the western value community. 
Further description follows on pages 16-24. See also: On Germanys Ostpolitik see: Helmut Wegner, The 
West German Ostpolitik, in The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI 
Journal), vol 135, Iss. 1, 1990, pp. 36-38; Klaus Mehnert, Ostpolitik: Germany’s Political Evergreen, in The 
Washington Quartery, vol 4, Iss. 1, 1981, pp. 179-183. 
2
 Boris Meissner, Die baltischen Staaten im weltpolitischen und völkerrechtlichen Wandel, Beiträge 
1954-1994, Hamburg 1995, p. 113; Henning von Wistinghausen, Im Freien Estland, Erinnerungen des 
ersten deutschen Botschafters 1991-1995, Köln 2004, p. 119. 
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can be regarded as an indicator that after the Cold War rational or geopolitical factors 
alone do not explain the German approach towards the Baltic states.
3
 
The generally accepted academic view in foreign policy analysis is that Germany after 
the reunification continued with the general foreign policy of former Western 
Germany.
4
 This continuity refers to the policy of western integration (Westbindung) and 
to the so-called Ostpolitik. The continuity of these foreign policy principles forces 
Germany to compromise and, in context of its potential, to set priorities for the policy 
towards the Baltic states which often might not meet with the foreign policy interests of 
the Baltic states.
5
 The accusations that the German Baltic policy is consequently without 
profile cannot be entirely disproved. However, researchers such as Dauchert and 
Markiewicz explain the German Baltic policy within the development of 
multilateralization of Germany’s foreign policy and point out that the contradictory 
approach in relation to the Baltic states is more likely a consequence of the intention to 
follow simultaneously the ambitious foreign policy norms of western integration and 
Ostpolitik rather than an intended disregard.
6
 
 
To accommodate demands arising from both Westbindung and Ostpolitik, even when 
the two norms might be in tension also after 2004 when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
joined the EU and NATO, German Baltic policy faces the same challenge of the 
competing norms in order to follow the continuity of Ostpolitik and the commitments 
related to Westbindung. The Crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia 
in March 2014 points out this tension in normative foundations of German foreign and 
Baltic policy in a striking way. On one hand, Germany seeks to maintain its good 
relations with Russia through constant dialogue. On the other hand the annexation of 
Crimea, the deterioration of EU-Russian relations including the economic sanctions 
towards Russia and the increasing security concerns of Eastern European countries and 
                                                          
3
 For an overview of Germany’s foreign policy since the end of the cold War, see: Sebastian Harnisch, 
Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy, German Politics, 10:1, 2001, pp. 35-60; 
Franz-Josef Meiers, A Change of Course? German Foreign and Security Policy After Unification, German 
Politics, vol. 11, issue 3, 2002, pp. 195-216. 
4
 Helge Dauchert,  Deutschlands Baltikumpolitik, Zwischen europäischer Integration und Annäherung an 
Russland, in NORDEUROPA forum, Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur, vol. 18,  2/2008, pp. 53-
73; Harnisch (2001). 
5
 Dauchert (2/2008). 
6
 Dauchert (2/2008). 
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Baltic states also meant, that Germany was under pressure to fulfill its commitments as 
a NATO ally. In the context of the events around the annexation of Crimea and the 
competing normative foundations of German foreign policy this research provides an 
understanding of the decisive characteristics of German-Baltic relations since 2004 and 
what are the likely guiding norms to influence the German Baltic policy. It is to capture 
how the competing norms from the continuity of Ostpolitik and the commitment and 
responsibility within western structures and NATO according to Westbindung are 
balanced in German Baltic policy before and after the annexation of Crimea. 
Accordingly the main research question is: 
What changes we see in German Baltic policy after the annexation of Crimea in 
2014? And what guiding norm is prioritized for the German Baltic policy before 
and after the annexation of Crimea? 
 
The aim is focusing on changes in the norms guiding German foreign policy. Foreign 
policy norms therefore, are considered as the independent variable. Accordingly, this 
research chooses the constructivist approach in foreign policy analysis
7
 because 
constructivists recognize the independent influence of identities and norms; and 
therefore allow explaining foreign policy changes beyond rational constraints. Indeed, 
this question can be also approached from rational and / or geopolitical perspectives and 
by following literature reviews on German foreign policy after reunification gives some 
examples, but the focus of this study is on the influence of norms in shaping foreign 
policy and more specifically on German foreign policy change in relation to the Baltic 
States. This study argues that the German foreign policies of Ostpolitik and 
Westbindung are in continuation and refer to domestic norms which experience a 
change in prioritization in light of the Ukraine Crisis and in consequence led to a change 
in German foreign policy towards the Baltic States. 
In order to do so this study will examine the German Baltic policy before and after the 
annexation of Crimea and outline in a cross-temporal case comparison the essential 
features of German-Baltic relations since 2004. In reference to the constructivist models 
                                                          
7
 For example see: Henning Boekle, et. al., Normen und Außenpolitik, Konstruktivistische 
Außenpolitiktheorie, in: Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, Nr. 
34., 1999. 
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of the ‘logic of appropriateness’, the expected changes are further explained by 
parliamentary debates of the German Bundestag. The constructivist model is suggested 
to be the most suiting because as different theories of foreign policy analysis indeed 
have conceptualized potential sources of change in foreign policy but do not sufficiently 
clarify the most likely sources of change.
8
 For example realist theories expect German 
foreign policy changes in light of changing power relations or as Forsberg summarizes 
in light of Russian threat Germany is expected to have a more accommodating position 
towards Russia, which as will be shown is not the case and Germany criticize Russian 
aggression.
9
 This would further suggest that Germany has geopolitical interests for 
example to underpin the NATO “spheres of influence”. The validity of such geopolitical 
consideration is not questioned but they do not explain why Germany engages in the 
Baltic states. Thus, the focus is more to understand the explanatory factors for German 
foreign policy actions towards the Baltic states which are seen in the foreign policy 
norms. Constructivist models do not displace rationalist attentions to interests but 
emphasize the social or intersubjective dimension of world politics.
10
 
While existing literature and previous studies in international relations and foreign 
policy analysis reveal a controversial and extensive discussion of continuation and 
change in Germany’s foreign policy after reunification, most of them do not provide 
explanations in light of competing norms. In general, we can outline three main strands 
of literature about German foreign policy after 1990. The first strand is the debate 
focusing mostly on the continuity and changes in the reunified German foreign policy in 
light of the changed international system after the Cold War. Sebastian Harnisch 
examined the early claims that continuity would have dominated changes in Germany’s 
foreign policy since 1990.
11
 He summarizes the controversy that came up in the 
                                                          
8
Tuomas Fosberg, From Ostpolitik to ‚frostpolitik‘?, Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards 
Russia, in International Affairs 92: 1, 2016, pp. 21-42, p. 38. 
9
 ibid. 
10
 Thomas Banchoff, Germany’s European Policy: A Constructivist Perspective, Program for the Study of 
Germany and Europe, Working Paper, Series #8.1, Harvard University, 1997-98, p.3-4 
11
 See: John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German 
Security Policy After Unification, Stanford University Press, 1999; Thomas Banchoff (1999), The German 
Problem Transformed. Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995, in Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press, 1999; Volker Rittberger (1999), ‘Deutschlands Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung, Zur 
Anwendbarkeit theoretischer Modelle der Außenpolitik: Machtstaat, Handelsstaat oder Zivilstaat?’, in 
Wolfgang Berger, Volker Ronge, Georg Weißeno (ed.), Friedenspolitik in und für Europa, Opladen, 1999, 
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distinctive perception “whether Germany followed the foreign policy course of the 
‘Bonn Republic’ or if it was normalizing its external behavior along the lines of other 
major power players (…).”12 Accordingly, the outcomes are very diverse and dependent 
on the individual research focuses which are often narrowed on either the continuity or 
change of Ostpolitik or Westbindung. Some scientists such as Steve Marsh conclude that 
the post-Cold War German foreign and security policy was by no mean in a crisis but 
the “burden of history encouraged German governments to defer key decisions about 
the future, whatever path they might have preferred to take within the normalization 
debate.”13 Others such as Patricia Davis and Peter Dombrovski are more precise and see 
a change where “Germany will pursue foreign policies ‘normal’ for a state of its size 
and strength”14 or Susanne Peters who do not see changes especially in German security 
policy but continuation within NATO structures
15
 as well as Randall Newsham who 
argues for the continuation of the successful Ostpolitik.
16
 
A second strand of German foreign policy analysis focuses on the actual debate of the 
‘normalization’ of German foreign policy. Mary N. Hampton emphasizes the concept of 
normalcy and concludes that in light of competing interpretations of Germany’s past, 
present and expectations for the future in the different studies the German ‘normalcy’ 
remains a “perhaps”.17 Ann L. Phillips analyzed the impact of Germany’s continued 
commitment to reconciliation with its neighbors in central-east Europe on traditional 
power relations in the region and argues that the politics of reconciliation scramble 
conventional power calculations in substantive ways to elevate central-east European 
                                                                                                                                                                          
pp.83–107; Simon Bulmer, et. al., 1999, Germany’s European Diplomacy, Shaping the Regional Milieu, 
Manchester University Press, 2000. 
12
 Harnisch, (2001), p. 36; Gunter Hellmann, ‘Jenseits von “Normalisierung” und “Militarisierung”: Zur 
Standortdebatte über die neue deutsche Außenpolitik’, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 1–2, 1997a, 
pp.24–33; A. James McAdams, ‘Germany After Unification, Normal At Last?’, World Politics, 49, 1997, 
pp.282–308. 
13
 Steve Marsh, The dangers of German history: Lessons from a decade of post‐cold war German foreign 
and security policy , Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3:3, 2002, pp. 389-424, p.414. 
14
 Patricia Davis/ Peter Dombrowski, Appetite of the wolf: German foreign assistance for central and 
eastern Europe, German Politics, 6:1, 1997, pp. 1-22, p. 18. 
15
 Susanne Peters, Germany's security policy after unification, Taking the wrong models’, European 
Security, 6:1, pp. 18-47, 1997, p. 18. 
16
 Randall Newnham, Economic Linkage and Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, The Case of the Warsaw Treaty, 
German Politics, 16:2, 2007, pp. 247-263, p. 247. 
17
 Mary N. Hampton, “The past, present, and the perhaps’ is Germany a “normal” power?, Security 
Studies, 10:2, 2000, pp. 179-202, p. 202. 
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authorities in their relation to Germany.
18
 For the German foreign policy towards Baltic 
states this means that instead of focusing on material constraints and power relations 
Germany has a profound need to shape its relations with the Baltic states in accordance 
with its historical responsibility. 
The third strand is the theoretical debate, which will be looked closer at below about 
how German foreign policy is approached. A key element for understanding Germany’s 
foreign policy is the connection of material or so called power politics and domestic 
values and norms of appropriate action that are based on the devastating experience of 
Germany’s foreign policy in the early 20th Century. The previous studies considered this 
issue mostly within the foreign policy principles of either Ostpolitik and the 
commitment to reconciliation towards the European countries or the Westbindung 
where German foreign policy is determined by its western integration. Accordingly, it is 
here argued that both Ostpolitik and Westbindung are to be considered. This makes it 
necessary to choose an approach to foreign policy analysis that prioritizes norms and 
ideas over material factors without neglecting them and places emphasis on domestic 
determinants of foreign policy rather than locating the source of German foreign policy 
in the international realms. The constructivist approach as described inter alia by Boekle 
(et.al.) provide with the concept of ‘logic of appropriateness’ a framework that allows to 
capture material constraints but embeds the material interests in a domestic ‘cognitive 
process’ where foreign policy is constructed by domestic understandings and ‘meaning 
structures’ of appropriate behavior and thus, norms.19  
The validity of Ostpolitik and Westbindung in German policy towards Baltic states is 
recognized already by earlier studies such as by Helge Daucherts dissertation which is 
for sure the most comprehensive research about German Baltic policy since 1991 until 
2004. He explains Germany’s early position to the Baltic states with a dilemma within 
the continued Ostpolitik and argues that good relations with Russia and the 
simultaneous promotion of Baltic states western integration were in contradiction to 
                                                          
18
 Ann L. Phillips, The politics of reconciliation: Germany in central-east Europe, in German Politics, vol. 
7. Iss. 2, 1998, pp. 64-85. 
19
 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Constructivism and Foreign Policy”, in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim 
Dunne (ed.), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 73; Maysam 
Behravesh, The Relevance of Constructivism to Foreign Policy Analysis, in E-International Relations, 
17.7.2011. 
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each other. That is why Germany never developed a clear and comprehensive policy 
framework for German-Baltic relations. He also focuses on Ostpolitik since his study 
does not include the time after the Baltic states joined the EU and NATO in 2004. The 
essential interests of western integration and consolidation of sovereignty and security 
of the Baltic states were for Dauchert achieved and by that the dilemma would have 
been dissolved. The German-Baltic relations after 2004 are since then mostly analyzed 
in the broader context of European integration,
20
 regional cooperation like the Baltic 
Sea region (BSR)
21
 and security policy (NATO) as shown above. The co-existence of 
Ostpolitik and Westbindung seemed in case of German Baltic policy unproblematic 
since 2004 because there were no contradictions seen. This, however, has changed with 
the Ukraine Crisis, that made the initial tension between the two foreign policy norms 
manifest. The first studies about the German foreign policy in light of the Ukraine Crisis 
are provided for example by Marco Siddi who analyzed the German foreign Policy 
towards Russia in the aftermath of Ukraine Crisis and asks if there are signs for a new 
Ostpolitik
22
 and Tuomas Fosberg who emphasizes the impact of the Ukraine Crisis on 
German-Russian relations.
23
 An initial examination about the influence of recent shifts 
in the discourse of German foreign and security policy in light of the Ukraine crisis  on 
policy outcomes was made by Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price.
24
 He argues that Germany, 
since the end of the Cold War lacks a strategic culture and informed public debate 
especially on security policy.
25
 The increased need in light of international crisis like 
Iraq, Libya and now Ukraine, Hyde-Price says that despite constructive response to the 
Ukraine crisis, “the discussion of the role of coercive military power in the mix of 
instruments that effective security policy and statecraft requires”26 remain the 
significant weakness of Germany and it would be now time “to think long and hard 
                                                          
20
 Sven Arnsward, EU Enlargement and the Baltic states, The Incremental Making of New Members, 
Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, vol. 7. Kauhava/Finland, 2000; Esko Anttola/ Milla 
Lehtimäki, Small States in the EU, Problems and Prospects of the Future, Jean Monnet Centre of 
Excellence University of Turku, Working Papers No. 10, 2001. 
21
 Zaneta Ozolina, Baltic Sea Region after the Enlargement of the European Union, Future Prospects, 
Zinatne, 2006. 
22
 Marco Siddi, German Foreign Policy towards Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis, A New 
Ostpolitik?, Europe-Asia Studies, 68:4, 20116, pp. 665-677. 
23
 Fosberg, (2016). 
24
 Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price, The “sleep-walking giant” awakes: resetting German foreign and security 
policy, European Security, 24:4, 2015, pp. 600-616. 
25
 ibid. p. 612. 
26
 Hyde-Price, (2015), p. 613. 
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about European security and strategy (…).”27 However, a study in light of the increasing 
security concerns of Central-East European countries and the Baltic states is so far 
missing and gives this study its motivation for the first attempt to grasp this issue. In 
reference to continuity of German foreign policy principles the annexation of Crimea by 
Russia caused a rebalancing of competing norms in German foreign policy which 
results in a change of German Baltic policy actions before and after the annexation of 
Crimea.  
In the following chapter the constructivist model in foreign policy and the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ is captured and is followed by the theoretical explanation for a 
prioritization of norms in foreign policy. The theoretical understanding of competing 
foreign policy norms is contextualized in the case of German Baltic policy where the 
competing norms by Ostpolitik and Westbindung are defined. The following 
methodology part explains the approach in the investigation of different features in 
German Baltic policy before and after the annexation of Crimea and outlines the cross-
temporal changes. Further, the observable indicators for foreign policy norms which are 
seen in parliamentary debates of the German Bundestag are defined in reference to 
constructivist theory because in constructivist understanding parliamentary debates are 
seen as a reflection of socially shared expectations in foreign policy actions. Finally, the 
captured cross-temporal changes in German Baltic policy are analyzed in context of 
parliamentary debates in the German Bundestag where statements and argumentation 
are attributed to the competing foreign policy norms of Ostpolitik and Westbindung. The 
study will then close with the conclusion where the research question is answered and 
the expectations of the change in the prioritization of German foreign policy norms are 
reflected in mentioned literature and also captures the limitations of this work including 
an outlook on aspects that need further considerations in future studies.  
                                                          
27
 Hyde-Price, (2015), p. 613. 
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1. Constructivism in foreign policy analysis 
 
In order to approach the above-made research question, this study adopts a 
constructivist framework of foreign policy analysis. This means that for the formulation 
of political interests the socio-constructivist concept sees the inter-subjective beliefs of 
the actors included in the political apparatus and the society.
28
 The essential actors are 
seen in the Government but in opposite to rationalist approaches constructivism 
suggests that a reconnection of interests into domestic decision-making process promote 
democratic legitimacy and therefore, the foreign policy “interest loses its character of 
overtime objectivity and becomes the product of a political decision-making process.”29 
Accordingly, constructivism understands the function of national interests as a reference 
category or compass in the decision-making process and although rationality of state 
actions is not neglected it is important to understand the “complementary relationship”30 
between interests and values in order to ensure the moral legitimization of foreign 
policy actions.
31
 This compass is here understood to be embodied in norms. In other 
words foreign policy norms are the foundation on which foreign policy interests are 
formulated. 
 
Constructivism understands foreign policy practices of states as a “product of discursive 
factors and socio-cultural constructions”32 It means that the aim of constructivism as a 
theory in foreign policy studies is to examine various cognitive processes which have 
impact on foreign policy constructions like identities, collective meaning structures of 
values and norms including their influence on foreign policy practices.
33
 While there are 
various strands of constructivism, they all have the similar premises that identities are 
the basis of interests which distinguishes them from rational theories who argue that 
interests are the driving variable. The constructivist starting point is the critique of this 
rationalist concept of the utility maximizing homo oeconomicus where the purpose of 
identities, values and norms are rather seen as an instrument for implementing foreign 
                                                          
28
 Sven Bernhard Gareis, Deutschlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Opladen, 2006, pp. 79 – 96, p. 81. 
29
 ibid. 
30
 ibid, p. 83. 
31
 ibid, p. 83-84. 
32
 Behravesh, (2011). 
33
 Checkel, (2008), p. 73. 
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policy interests.
34
 Thus, constructivists see the independent influence of identities and 
norms as a variable which according to Hasenclever and Rittberger and other 
constructivists, is not compatible with the homo oeconomicus.
35
 Instead, they suggest 
another concept for an actor which is called the homo sociologicus or role player where 
decision making is based on the ‘Logic of appropriateness’ which refers to social shared 
and value-based expectations of reasonable action in foreign policy.
36
 
 
Besides the distinction to rational theories the foreign policy studies divides 
constructivism into two major strands. Whereas the core premises of constructivism is 
opposed to rationalist theories the constructivist theory is further and in fact deeply 
divided with regard to methodological and epistemological terms.
37
 In epistemological 
sense constructivism can be divided into further two main strands: The so-called North 
American variant also known as ‘conventional’ or ‘standard’ constructivism, 
represented inter alia by Alexander Wendt, Emmanuel Adler, Peter Katzenstein and 
Martha Finnmore, is an epistomologically positivist approach where social norms and 
identities have an essential role in the construction of international politics and the 
outcomes of foreign policies.
38
 The positivist perspective therefore, has a more 
deductive approach to outline a causal relationship of actors, norms and identities and 
interests on foreign policy outcomes where the influence of national interests and 
material objectives are by no mean neglected but are not the foundation of foreign 
policy actions. Instead, “states’ constructed identities, shared understandings and socio-
political situation in the broader international system which to a large extent determines 
their interests and the foreign policy practices to secure them.”39 
 
The seconds strand or ‘European variant’ of constructivism represented inter alia by 
Friedrich Kratochwil, Ted Hopf
40
 is a more post-constructivist (interpretivism) 
approach where the causal connection of identities and norms and foreign policy action 
                                                          
34
 Boekle, (1999), p. 4. 
35
 Boekle, (1999), p. 4. 
36
 ibid. 
37
 Maysam Behravesh, (2011). 
38
 ibid; Fred Chernoff, Theory and Metatheory in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), p. 
69. 
39
 Behravesh, (2011). 
40
 Chernoff, (2008), p. 69. 
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is less of interest rather than the role of language and linguistic construction on social 
constructions and reality as such and by that focuses more on the development of 
identities and norms. In other words, this more inductive research approach explores the 
conditions of possibility for changes in identities and norms in the first place without 
asking further their influence on foreign policy actions.
41
 
The basis of competing norms is here seen in the domestic debate of foreign policies 
and thus, refers to the positivist approach which will come clear further below in the 
distinction of socialization processes. While alternative constructivist perspective are 
further categorized in different forms the so-called unit-level constructivist theory 
particularly represented by Katzenstein focuses on domestic political level and by that 
on the, in words of Reus-Smit “relationship between domestic social and legal norms 
and the identities and interests of states”42 Based on this the competing foreign policy 
norms in German Baltic policy are seen in the German domestic debate and legal 
foundations of socially shared value based expectations of reasonable action. This 
brings us to the mentioned concept of ‘logic of appropriateness’ that explains the 
connection of foreign policy actions and domestic norms.  
 
1.1 ‘Logic of appropriateness’ 
 
As above mentioned the constructivist model in foreign policy analysis sees the link 
between the independent variable of norms and the legitimated foreign policy behavior 
of states in the logic of appropriateness.
43
 An essential part of empirical constructivist 
studies is to outline the connection between social constructions and concrete behavior 
or options of action. This connection is described in the logic of appropriateness which 
states that: “behaviors (beliefs as well as actions) are intentional but not willful. They 
involve fulfilling the obligations of a role in a situation, and so of trying to determine 
the imperatives of holding a position. [...] Within a logic of appropriateness, a sane 
person is one who is `in touch with identity' in the sense of maintaining consistency 
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between behavior and a conception of self in a social role”44 It means that the action or 
behavior of an actor is not driven by individual believes but on the intersubjectively 
shared expectation of appropriate behavior; means norms. Therefore, norms influence 
the definitions of such obligations of an actor in a situation which are derived from 
domestic values and identities. Expectations of appropriate behavior within a social 
system can become self-evident and as such are not necessarily reflected by actors. 
Therefore, the claim of constructivism is to grasp the actors conscious as well as the 
culturally handed self-evident norms. The logic of appropriateness takes both levels into 
account. 
According to the logic of appropriateness, the constructivist understanding is that social 
norms function as independent variables for the explanation of foreign policy 
behavior.
45
 This is in contrast to rational models where actors choose between different 
options of action in the aim of personal or material utility maximization. Instead, 
constructivism argues that values and identities precede interests and the choice of 
action is based on the resulting norms. The influence of norms on foreign policy 
behavior therefore, cannot be reduced on rational constraints and incentives where it 
just increases or reduces the costs of certain action and by that have a merely regulative 
effect on foreign policy behavior.
46
 More likely, as Klotz says: “norms legitimize goals 
and thus, define actors’ interests“.47 By legitimizing certain foreign policy goals a 
constitutive effect is attributed to norms as ‘motives’.48 It means that the effect of norms 
as a motive is that states define their foreign policy interests according to the 
legitimated goals.
49
 
 
Nevertheless, norms as explaining variables face the challenge of an often difficult 
empirical applicability and this is indeed accused of being the weak point of the 
constructivist approach. To increase the empirical applicability of norms and improve 
their explanatory power ex-ante the definition of norms and the observable implications 
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have to be precise. Based on several constructivist studies Boekle define three features 
of a norm that justify its explanatory power for foreign policy studies. The features are 
seen in the (1) intersubjectivity, (2) immediate behavioral orientation and (3) 
counterfactual validity. Norms are therefore, defined as “intersubjective shared and 
value-based expectations of reasonable behavior”50 
The feature of intersubjectivity distinguishes norms from individual convictions or in 
terms of Goldstein and Keohane “beliefs held by individuals”.51 Although a social 
origin of individual beliefs and values indeed is not denied and several studies inter alia 
Thomas Banchhoffs research on Germany’s Europe policy after 1990 argue that the 
further European integration policy by the German Government was based on “Helmut 
Kohl’s historical idea”52 other researchers such as Audie Klotz respond that “examining 
decision-making processes through individual motivation and cognition alone ignores 
the commonality of shared underlying dominant ideas or knowledge.”53 According to 
Klotz, it was not the ‘belief system’ of Helmut Kohl as such but the domestic social 
consensus on which it was based. Further the approach to explain foreign policy 
behavior by individual belief systems inevitably raises the question of the social roots of 
individual convictions without offering an answer.
54
 
To increase the distinction of norms from individual beliefs and further to understand 
the explanatory power of a norm it is important to outline the commonality of a norm. 
Commonality indicates how widely a norm is shared in a social system and therefore, 
explains how strong a norm is anchored in a social system (society, political elites).
55
 
With a plurality of different norms in a social system, the question arises why 
expectations of one group of actors in a certain system are more decisive than the 
expectations from other groups. With this question however, the norm itself becomes 
the dependent variable. Only in the case where it can be assumed that one group is 
stronger than the competing group because of their shared expectations, a norm can be 
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defined as an independent variable with the required explanatory power.
56
 At what point 
a norm is seen as accepted and how many actors in a social system are necessary for 
that is not to be considered here further. Decisive is to capture when a norm becomes 
likely to guide foreign policy actions. Therefore, the main interest here is in the 
accounting for foreign policy change and if this is caused by a change in the 
constellation of norms. Why this norm-change occurres is a different question which is 
here left to others to explore. For this study a helpful idea comes from Simon Koschut 
who sees in external shocks a potential norm challenger where established norms might 
be questioned. 
57
 Here it is merely suggested that external shocks such as the Ukraine 
crisis can lead to a change in norm prioritization rather than the questioning of norms as 
such. In short, it is important to show that there is a change in the constellation of 
norms, not why. 
 
In the second feature it is to consider that the intersubjective character of norms with the 
implicated expectations for reasonable behavior are not always equally precise because 
norms in contrast to principles do not explicitly assess behavior (even though it 
implicitly does) but only name an expected reasonable action for the actor to do or an 
unreasonable action to abstain from.
58
 For example to say ‘stealing is bad’ is a value 
based principle whereas ‘you shall not steal’ is a concrete, social shared and value based 
expectation of appropriate behavior and thus, a norm.
59
 In the case of German foreign 
policy, this means for example that whereas the principle of Westbindung refers to 
Germany’s engagement for western values the implicated norm of solidarity is a 
concrete value based expectation to support the partners within the value community. 
Constructivists inter alia Raymond and Franck argue that the influence of a norm is not 
only determined by the commonality but also how precise this norm is in its explication 
between reasonable and unreasonable action. Therefore, it is important for implying a 
norm as an independent variable that it distinguishes clearly between these two things. 
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As a third feature of norms as independent variable Boekle describes the so-called 
counterfactual validity. Even though norms do not explicitly refer to a principle or 
value, the expected action is based on a principle as the example of stealing shows. 
Because of this reference to a principle or value, norms have according to Hurrell a, 
from interests independent, “compliance pull”60 This means that the existence of a norm 
is not questioned even though actors might occasionally behave against it.
61
 Obviously, 
this kind of unassailable position of norms cannot be overstretched since not every 
ethic-moral request, which has been at some point raised and in fact was ignored can be 
defined as a norm.
62
 In combination with the previous features, counterfactual validity 
can, however, underline the importance and consequently the prioritization of a norm in 
a social system and its influence on foreign policy action which meets precisely the 
interest of this study. 
 
To conclude a norm as an independent variable can explain foreign policy actions when 
it is intersubjectively shared at domestic level, when there is a clear distinction between 
appropriate and inappropriate action, and the validity of the norm stands beyond 
interests and occasional circumstances which might cause the temporal ignorance or 
secondary importance of the norm. The question what foreign policy goals are seen as 
legitimated depends on the socialization process of foreign policy actors. Without 
emphasizing the socialization processes
63
 which are emphasized particularly by Weiß 
and Schimmelfennig too much as such, it is here important to point out that with regard 
to foreign policy actors there are two simultaneous socialization processes which are 
analytically distinguished. On one hand foreign policy actors are in an international 
social system where foreign policy decision makers, thus, the Government and ‘states’ 
appropriate international norms between states (transnational socialization) and on the 
other hand in the domestic social system where foreign policy actors appropriate 
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national norms or socially shared norms (societal socialization).
64
 Accordingly, states 
are in an interface of two social and normative systems.  International and national 
norms are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Since the different social systems cannot 
be seen as completely independent from each other and international norms might be 
implemented in domestic norms and vice versa it is here suggested that because of 
different socialization processes actors, as already mentioned can have a plurality of 
norms. The plurality again means that norms can be in a competing relations because 
both international and national norms need domestic resonance. The international and 
national social understanding can differ without being exclusive to each other. How 
these socialization processes look in detail and how norms develop shall be considered 
in a different context. The point is that different domestic norms exist and the conflict 
relation occurs in the decision which norm is to be followed and prioritized. Thus, the 
different domestic norms merge in the foreign policy actor and the decision-making 
process. The action results in this understanding from the constant balancing and 
prioritization of the competing foreign policy norms. 
 
1.2 Competition and prioritization of  competing foreign policy norms 
 
For the constructivist models the origin of a norm is not in focus but the interaction of 
international and societal norms. As above shown the widespread view is that the norms 
of German foreign policy remained constant after 1990.
65
 The assumption that norms 
are strongly embedded in international and national institutions supports the hypothesis 
that the influence of norms persists and (rapid) changes in norms are unlikely.  
The problem here is that constructivism assumes that with rapid external changes also 
the norm prioritization might experience changes which indeed are difficult to predict. 
In a case of competing foreign policy norms, we cannot predict that the pursuit of one 
norm inevitably invalidates the other norm. Instead, it is suggested that the validity of 
domestic foreign policy norms remain also in light of external changes but in a case of 
competing norms a re-weighting occurs and the prioritization of norms change without 
rejecting one or another norm. This seems permitted since constructivism allow a 
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general prediction if a foreign policy can be characterized conform to norms (or 
standardized) in sudden upheavals or shock-like context changes. 
Germany’s competing norms of foreign policy suggest different paths in the approach 
towards the Baltic states. A norm-guided foreign policy behavior means that in a case of 
competing norms each of them as such should show a different path in foreign policy 
actions. Germany’s foreign policy principles of Ostpolitik and Westbindung form such 
different foreign policy paths and norm constellation. The following description of 
German Baltic policy in the last decades since the end of the Cold War and re-
establishment of diplomatic relations in 1991 shows what behavior we should expect 
from the German Federal Government towards the Baltic states in light of the principles 
of Ostpolitik and Westbindung. We will see that the German Baltic policy is 
characterized by the balance of competing norms and the importance of domestic norms 
of appropriate foreign policy actions.  
18 
 
2. Competing foreign policy norms in German Baltic policy 
 
Germany’s policy towards the Baltic states is generally described in one “Baltic policy” 
(Baltikumpolitik).
66
 This results from the general academic and Germany’s political 
understanding of the Baltic states as one geopolitical region.
67
 Even though Germany 
was one of the first countries to re-establish diplomatic relations with Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania after the restoration of their independence in 1991, the circumstances in 
Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the USSR changed and the role of these three 
states in German foreign policy was not very clear.
68
 The German Federal Government 
found it difficult to formulate a coherent position towards this region and despite 
separate declarations of bilateral diplomatic relations further specific policy papers or 
concepts fir the bilateral relations are missing up today.
69
 Despite the existence of 
individual bilateral relations the German approach towards Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania is very similar and therefore, can be summarized in one policy framework in 
German foreign policy. The uniform German perception of the Baltic states can be, 
among others tracked back by the actual implementation of the foreign policy. When 
looking at the actions of German foreign policy in relation to the Baltic states we can 
outline three facets of foreign policy which are here described as economic cooperation, 
diplomacy and security cooperation. 
Economic cooperation describes the relations between Germany and the Baltic states in 
material and financial matters. One key element is the common EU finance policy 
which found particular emphasis during the financial crisis in the EU in 2008-2009. As 
will be shown below the Baltic states were often mentioned as an example in the 
German domestic debate about the consequences of the financial crisis and how to deal 
with them. Therefore, the cooperation and consultation on the level of regional 
cooperation formats are an important platform for Germany’s Baltic policy. It 
underlines both Germany’s and Baltic states understanding to see the economic 
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cooperation in the whole EU context. For example, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs describes that “[t]he major objective of Estonia’s EU policy is to do the utmost 
to strengthen the euro area further. This must be done in conjunction with further 
deepening of the Single Market and the strengthening of the financial system and the 
Single Market in financial services.”70 However, the economic cooperation is for the 
Baltic states of much more significant importance than for Germany who in turn puts 
special emphasis on the energy cooperation within the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). 
Especially the case of the Nord Stream pipeline shows the general mindset in German 
foreign and security policy with regard to the Baltic states. Therefore, the key issue here 
is, in reference to the challenging norms of Ostpolitik and Westbindung, to capture the 
connection of economic and security policy and how it affects the approach towards the 
Baltic states. 
The second facet of diplomacy refers to the public and symbolic communication in 
bilateral relations. By definition diplomacy in its basics is about communication 
between states, or in words of Bjola and Kornsprobst the “institutionalized 
communication among internationally recognized representatives of internationally 
recognized entities through which these representatives produce, manage and distribute 
public goods.”71 Bjola and Kornprobst outline that “there are a plethora of rules and 
norms that diplomats become socialized [!] into and these rules and norms govern the 
communication among diplomats”72 It means that German foreign policy actors have 
self-imposed rules and pattern how to communicate with the Baltic states 
representatives. This underlines once more the relevance of constructivist understanding 
of norms as guiding factor in foreign policy. Indeed, German politicians, in order to 
emphasize or kind of legitimize the relations to the Baltic states for itself and for the 
public, refer to the long shared history which goes back to the Nordic crusades by the 
end of the twelfth century and was followed by seven-hundred-years of dominion of the 
Baltic-Germans as upper class in the region of Baltic states. They decisively influenced 
the cultural, social and economic development of the Baltic states until the 19-20
th
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Century.
73
 The Baltic-German dominion ended with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 
August 1939 and Germany’s consciousness for its responsibility for the consequences 
for the Baltic states explains German pronounced need for reparations and support for 
the Baltic states and in fact for all Eastern European countries foremost Poland and 
Russia. The resulting norms, rules and principles are suggested to be reflected in the 
diplomatic outcome and thus, show references to the the challenging norms in German 
foreign policy and what normative interpretation is prioritized in regard to the Baltic 
states. 
The German historic consciousness also affects the third facet of security cooperation in 
the Baltic policy. After the Cold War nowhere the contradiction between the support for 
western integration of the Eastern European countries on one hand and the consideration 
of Russian interests and their inclusion into cooperative structures on the other hand was 
more evident than in the Baltic states.
74
 The quick integration into EU and NATO 
pursued by the Baltic states in demarcation to Russia and Germany’s principle of a 
European security system with the inclusion of Russia contained a ‘dilemma’ as 
described by Dauchert.
75
 He in particular captured the early debate on the membership 
of the Baltic states into the NATO and shows how the German Federal Government 
hesitated to find a clear position towards the Baltic states.
76
 During the early 1990s the, 
at that time, Minister of Defense Volker Rühe rejected a NATO membership of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania on the ground that such enlargement could “endanger the internal 
cohesion of the alliance”77 and Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl even rejected a 
principle Eastern Enlargement of NATO because it would put pressure on the good 
German-Russian relations and potentially even lead to a “re-division of Europe”.78 Only 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel recognized the security needs of the Baltic states and 
argued that in principle the Baltic states interests are compatible with German foreign 
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policy interests. Especially, if the NATO enlargement is limited to few countries, such 
as Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary, so Kinkel, it could reduce the security status 
of the Baltic states.
79
 The internal debate was eventually stopped by Kohl in 1995 and 
the interests of security policies within the Germany Federal Government were defined 
in favor to Russia and largely ignored the interests of the Baltic states. With this 
Germany established the norm of Ostpolitik as the prioritized approach towards Baltic 
states in which Russian interests where considered firstly or at least the dialog with 
Russia was pursued foremost. 
Nevertheless, the EU and NATO membership of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was 
realized in 2004 and while Germany under the Chancellorship of Kohl approached the 
European security according to Ostpolitik, the fundamental ‘dilemma’ in German Baltic 
policy turned into practically competing norms. Germany’s post-Cold War commitment 
towards the Baltic states was to (1) support their western integration and (2) 
accommodate Russian interests. With the continuation of Ostpolitik and Westbindung, 
the new situation after 2004, however, has not brought about any clarity in the German 
Baltic policy. The German Federal Government deals since then with practical 
competing norms which are in constant balancing because the norm of Ostpolitik has an 
general more broader approach, as will be shown, where Baltic states interests are 
implicitly considered and diverted to the multilateral level where Russia is involved.  
On the other hand Germany’s Westbindung requires considering Baltic states interests 
more directly and within the EU and NATO Community were Russian is not a decisive 
factor. 
In summary the German Baltic policy since 2004 is characterized by the competing 
norms of Ostpolitik to follow the long-term stable development of a European security 
system where Russia is included and the norm of Westbindung where a value 
community within EU and NATO where, especially in the event of perceived threat 
Russian interests are not decisive. While this competing relation of foreign policy norms 
seems to be incompatible it is here suggested that these norms are in constant balancing 
where one of these norms is prioritized. This results from the theoretical understanding 
of norms as explaining variables in foreign policy where the socially shared expectation 
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of reasonable behavior has an influence on foreign policy decision making. As above 
mentioned, in case of a plurality of norms from different principles means also that the 
norms show a different path in foreign policy actions. 
In relation to the Baltic states the German foreign policy is characterized by such an 
plurality of norms which consist of two competing norms based on the foreign policy 
principles of Ostpolitik and Westbindung.. The following description show the different 
paths Germany’s Baltic policy takes in light of these two principles.    
 
2.1 Norm of Ostpolitik –‘Change through rapprochement’ 
 
The above-mentioned continuity of German Ostpolitik remained one of the core foreign 
policy frameworks towards Eastern European countries after the Cold War. Thus, the 
reunified Germany continued with the foreign policy of former West Germany and with 
that refers to the continuity of Ostpolitik as an integral part of Germany’s foreign 
policy.
80
 The ‘Ostpolitik’ which was established by the Federal government of Willy 
Brandt in 1969 describes a new policy framework in order to renew the relations 
primarily between West and East Germany and further a policy towards the communist 
block and particularly towards Soviet Russia.
81
 Concrete it means that German 
Governments searched cooperative economic cooperation towards the USSR which 
would lead to positive changes.
82
 This approach is known as ‘change through 
rapprochement’83 which was continued towards the post-Soviet Russia with particular 
emphasis on economic interlocking.
84
 After the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy 
norms of reunified Germany support comprehensive plans to promote a peaceful and 
integrated Europe. Thus, the norms of post-Cold War Ostpolitik includes (1) the support 
for European integration of EEC countries and the Baltic states and at the same time (2) 
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the promotion of a security system in Europe with the inclusion of Russia into westerns 
structures. By that the importance of having good cooperative relations with Russia 
remained the determining principle of Germany’s Ostpolitik during the End of the Cold 
War, the dissolution of Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany and was since then 
in general adopted by all German Governments up today.
85
 
 
Within the norm of ‘change through rapprochement’ according to Ostpolitik, the 
economic cooperation and security policies one reinforces the other. A case study by 
Newnhams underlines this connection of economic and security policy within 
Germany’s Ostpolitik by arguing that “Germany has been particularly successful in 
using economic incentives (positive linkage) to improve ties with its neighbors.”86 His 
conclusion is that Chancellor Brandt’s strategy to increase economic ties with the East 
eventually in the long run might have had a decisive role to change the Cold War 
dynamics in Europe and suggests further that “positive economic linkage might help to 
resolve other disputes in our present-day world”87 Thus, the comprehensive plan with 
the norm of ‘change through rapprochement’ seeks for the economic linkages within 
Eastern European Countries (including Russia) and Western Europe with the aim to not 
only protect and maximize the good German-Russian relations but also, according to 
Kleuters to protect the continuity of the outcome process where ‘peace’, 
‘reconciliation’, or ‘Europeaness’ can be achieved.88 
In case of the Baltic states it means that even though the support for European 
integration of EEC countries and the Baltic states after 1991 is out of question and also 
emphasized in bilateral meetings and diplomacy the simultaneous promotion of a 
security system in Europe with inclusion of Russia limits the efforts in political and 
especially security cooperation insofar as in security cooperation Germany avoid all 
kind of actions that could possibly provoke Russia. All security related issues in the 
Baltic states are dealt in light of Russian interests and Germany refuses to participate in 
NATO troop exercises which are criticized by Russia and perceived as a provocation. 
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Moreover, the energy security is of high priority for Germany and the emphasis on 
multilateral cooperation within the Baltic Sea Region aims to secure the energy supply 
in Europe. 
 
2.2 Norm of Westbindung –Western solidarity 
 
Since the end of WWII Germany’s Westbindung was a “fundamental goal of the 
state.”89 The first German Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s policy of 
Westbindung was the answer to the considered danger of Germany’s neutral position in 
face of communist expansion.
90
 Further, the Westbindung was to avoid a renewed 
strengthening of German nationalism and unilateral foreign policy making. During the 
Cold War, the transatlantic relation including NATO and the relations in Europe 
especially with France was of essential importance to integrate Germany into western 
structures. Inter alia Mary N. Hampton argues that “NATO has had a powerful effect in 
creating positive security identification between the United States and Germany”91 She 
tested in the context of German-American relations in the NATO the existence of 
transnational positive identity formation and focused on the understanding of German 
security identity and its perception of others.
92
 In her study on the role of historical 
memory as it pertains to German-American relations she argues that the purpose of joint 
NATO mission “was to forge a positive identity among member states by helping to 
create a shared sense of history and destiny.”93 This clearly refers to the above 
mentioned transnational socialization of Germany in international organizations where 
the foreign policy norm is based on the shared values and identity within a community, 
here the NATO. Accordingly the Baltic states since 2004 also belong to this security 
community and Germany should share with them the same security identification. 
Further Hampton discusses, in reference to Wendt the impact of the reconstruction of 
shared history in creating a sense of solidarity, community, loyalty to the trans-Atlantic 
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allies and Germany’s role in the NATO.94 Notable is her conclusion that “while 
Germans have been resilient in their continued security identification with the United 
States through NATO, the lack of positive identity in the vital arena of national 
economic identity has led to a bifurcation of the trans-Atlantic relationship.”95 The 
relationship between Germany and the US is in Hamptons view characterized by 
tensions, “where balancing and egoistic behavior could potentially dominate in the 
economic relationship, while a positive identity has arisen in the security 
relationship.”96 In short it means that Germany’s Westbindung and strong relations with 
the USA and western allies relies in particular on the shared positive security identity 
built up during the Cold War era where security matters dominated, the early post-Cold 
War period, in turn, brought up increasingly economic issues in foreign policies which 
might lead to a decrease in the shared sense of solidarity and loyalty. While Hampton 
made the case primarily for the relation between Germany and USA this applies in 
principles to all allies and since the NATO enlargement also to the Baltic states. In the 
understanding of Westbindung economic and security issues are therefore, seen 
separated from each other. 
While the continuation of Ostpolitik, as seen above in the reunification German foreign 
policy is seen as given the question is what does it mean for the Westbindung? For 
Denison the “integrationist impulse and multilateralism as the most vital interest”97 
Germany would have put this goal on all reservations about the use of military force. 
For the German foreign policy it means that the European balance of power is to be 
replaced by integration and co-determination but up today Germany commitment to 
peace in Europe did not consider the practical necessity of force. In Denisons view 
“Germany’s challenge has been to reconcile deep-seated principles with the changing 
international reality”98 Other such as Susanne Peters, in turn, argue that in “short- and 
mid-term perspective Germany is not particularly interested in strengthening the 
European component of its security policy, but rather in emphasizing its traditional 
transatlantic security policy in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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(NATO).”99 Germany’s foreign policy according to Westbindung therefore, indeed 
should distinguish between economic, political and security policies and relocates these 
policy areas into the respective multilateral structures, which are mostly not connected 
in the decision making and implementation. 
For our case of German Baltic policy since 2004, it means that in opposite to the 
continued Ostpolitik Germany’s foreign policy norm by its Westbindung differentiates 
between economic, political and security matters. Thus, the answer to Baltic states 
security concerns shall be answered within the NATO alliance whereas economic and 
political cooperation is within EU structures. By that the German government separated 
the economic and political cooperation from security matters and the strong shared 
values and identity with the Baltic states within EU and NATO. Accordingly, the 
German Baltic policy makes strong reference to shared historical and cultural 
experience and values where material aspects are important and carried out in EU 
structures but do not have decisive influence for the security cooperation within the 
NATO. Germany accordingly should be committed to the unrestricted solidarity with 
the Baltic states as NATO partners who do not see the primary bound by material 
factors but on the common value based community. 
To summarize the features of German Baltic policy in light of the competing norms 
‘change through rapprochement’ from Ostpolitik and the unrestricted solidarity and 
loyalty from Westbindung show a different path how the German Baltic policy should 
be carried out. A following graph illustrates the different type of Germany’s Baltic 
policy according to the competing norms. In the following chapters, the German Baltic 
policy is captured in a cross-temporal case comparison, which will be explained in 
following, where the focus is on the time period before and after the annexation of 
Crimea by Russia in March 2014. It is to show how the observable German-Baltic 
relations refer to the competing norms in German foreign policy. 
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Type of Germany’s Baltic policy according to the guiding norm: 
 Economic 
cooperation 
Diplomacy Security 
cooperation 
Change through 
rapprochement 
(Ostpolitik) 
- Priority on 
economic 
interlocking 
- Baltic states 
considered in 
multilateral formats 
- promotion of 
cooperative formats 
with Russia and 
Russian minorities 
- visits divided into 
different levels of 
representatives 
Passive role, 
minimization of 
participation in 
NATO missions 
and focus on 
dialogue with 
Russia 
- focus on energy 
security  
Unrestricted 
Solidarity 
(Westbindung) 
- Focus on 
economic 
cooperation within 
EU structures 
- integration of 
Baltic states in the 
energy market 
- innovative 
cooperation 
- Emphasis on 
shared history, 
culture and values 
- specified bilateral 
relations 
- Active role, 
material and 
personal support 
and participation in 
NATO exercises 
- security more 
important than 
material costs. 
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3. Methodology 
 
To empirically show a change and further a prioritization of a competing norm in 
German Baltic policy it is to show in a cross-temporal case comparison how the 
German Baltic policy was carried out before the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 
March 2014 and the following time up today.
100
 The choice for a cross-temporal case 
comparison approach results from the advantage it provides. One important advantage 
of a case study method is the high levels of conceptual validity.
101
 It means that 
especially social scientists face the challenge how to measure qualitative variables like 
democracy, power or political culture, which in their understanding and definition 
might differ significantly.
102
 The advantage of case studies therefore, lies especially for 
constructivists, in the contextualization of qualitative variables in one specific case that 
allow capture changes in a specific case.
103
 
For this study it means that the German Baltic policy as a case can be captured and 
explained by outlining features that show changes over a time period. A cross-temporal 
case study allow showing a causal mechanism with the advantage of modeling and 
assessing more complex causal mechanisms where it is possible to take into account 
also a larger number of intervening variables.
104
 Since the explaining variables for 
German foreign policy indeed can be identified in different ways as the previous 
literature suggest, the cross-temporal case comparison allow the focus on norms as 
independent variable and not neglect also other possible factors. Since the research 
interest is to explain a change in German Baltic policy during the Ukraine Crisis by a 
change in prioritization of foreign policy norms the cross-temporal case comparison as 
aconcept allows to make such causal relation. Thus, this study uses the cross-temporal 
case comparison first on the implementation of the three above mentioned aspects of 
economic cooperation, diplomacy and security cooperation and compares how these 
features were carried out the before and after the annexation of Crimea and show what 
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the German Baltic policy focused each period and what have changed over time. 
Accordingly, it is to define the three features in more detail: 
The economic cooperation is here measured by the level of export trade between 
Germany and Baltic states. Although export rates as such are only a rough indicator and 
do not reflect the entire range of economic cooperation (such as direct investments or 
development of new markets) it nevertheless shows the overall development and 
relevance of material and economic factors and the general character of German-Baltic 
relations. With a comparison on German-Russian trade development is it further to see 
how the economic cooperation is interlocked. If such interlocking is noticeable in a 
significant way, this indicates a more Ostpolitik-informed foreign policy. If again such 
interlocking is not noticed it indicates that a Westbindung-informed policy is prioritized. 
In combination with the other features of diplomacy and security cooperation, the 
export rates give the first reference how important economic and material factors are in 
German foreign policy. 
With the diplomacy, it is here to capture the thematic focus in German-Baltic relations. 
In this regard the institutional foundation of German foreign policy is important. 
Because the focus in foreign policies is determined mostly by the political actors; in this 
case the German Federal Chancellor and the Foreign Minister and thus, the Chancellery 
respectively Foreign Ministry. Accordingly the German Chancellery and Foreign 
Ministry have a different weighting in foreign policy where the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is assumed to looks more for the direct bilateral cooperation with the Baltic 
states and takes their interests more into account, whereas the position of the Federal 
Chancellery is considered in a broader context and links the approach towards the Baltic 
states in a broader regional approach including Russia.
105
 This difference can be used 
consciously to convey a certain message and symbolism, which represents the general 
view of the German Federal Government towards the Baltic states. Based on the balance 
between visits of the Federal Chancellor and the Foreign Minister and also Federal state 
representatives and Members of Parliaments diplomacy indicates the contextualization 
of German Baltic policy. If the norm of change through rapprochement and Ostpolitik 
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dominate, it would suggest a more indirect diplomacy where German Baltic policy is 
primarily treated within broader context such as regional cooperation and dialogue with 
Russia and German Federal Chancellor Merkel is more visible in German Baltic policy. 
If again the Foreign Minister Steinmeier is visible and the Baltic states’ interests are 
considered directly, it indicates the prioritization of solidarity and Westbindung. To 
underline the context it is further to capture the thematic focus, according to official 
Governments statements, visit reports and Press statements by the Federal Government 
representatives. It gives an idea if more economic and material factors are emphasized 
or more the value based factors with historical and cultural reference which in the 
second part of the cross-temporal case comparison, as will be shown, could be then 
attributed to the competing norms. 
As Security cooperation is here understood the actual military cooperation of Armed 
Forces. Accordingly, this feature focuses primarily on operations by NATO and 
Germany participation. Here it is important to take into account the legal aspects of 
Germany’s law which determine the use of military force and is highly restricted. 
Besides general arming restrictions, the German government can use the Army (despite 
for self-defense or in a case of alliance solidarity) only by international arrangement and 
multinational compositions and means that either a UN or NATO mandate is 
required.
106
 Therefore, this feature of security cooperation will be captured by the 
visible German activity in NATO exercises and operations in and with the three Baltic 
states. The more Germany hesitate to do defence related cooperation with, or within the 
Baltic states the more it could indicate that Russia’s concerns about NATO troops and 
activity in the Baltic states is taken into account and thus, refer to the prioritization of 
Ostpolitik. Accordingly the more Germany show active participation and willingness to 
cooperate with the Baltic states in defence issues, the more likely it indicate a 
prioritization of  western solidarity.    
In the second part of the cross-temporal case comparison it is then to explain the 
implemented German Baltic policy and the changes before and after 2014 by the 
balance of two competing norms, change through rapprochement and alliance solidarity, 
as can be seen from parliamentary debates of the German Bundestag. One of the most 
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important functions of the German Bundestag in German foreign policy is to create a 
public sphere through debates.
107
 In the understanding of the above described 
conventional constructivist model or more precise in the unit-level constructivist theory 
by Katzenstein the domestic political debates and the relation and interaction of 
domestic social and legal norms are here understood as a reflection or “megaphone”108 
of German domestic shared norms in foreign policy. It means that the analysis of 
parliamentary debates indicate how the competing norms of change through 
rapprochement and the western solidarity are represented in the domestic German 
society and political debate. Another important role of the Bundestag is related 
particularly to security policy. The German law namely requires that any armed military 
operation outside the own legal territory requires an approval by the German 
Bundestag.
109
 With the already mentioned exception of self-defence and operation 
within NATO territory where a mandate is not legally required the parliamentary 
debate, however, play a significant role in the legitimization of any kind of military 
operation of German armed forces. Not least because of that the parliamentary debates 
and thus, the Bundestag are an important reference to show the prioritization of 
domestic norms as a foundation for German foreign, and in this case, Baltic policy. 
To do so Parliamentary protocols provided by the official records of the Bundestag are 
in reference to the constructivist model considered as sources for social opinion and 
normative foundation for foreign policy. For Searching relevant documents for the time 
period 2010-2016 the results for following terms are : Baltikum (35 protocols), 
Baltische Staaten (35), Estland (65), Lettland (71), Litauen (72), Ostsee (108) and 
Ostseerat (3,) Ostpolitik (42), Westbindung (3).
110
 To reduce the high results and at the 
same time increase the relevance of the documents for this study these first results were 
filtered with keywords referring to the aspects of economic cooperation, diplomacy and 
security cooperation and thus, could provide information about the foreign policy 
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principles of Ostpolitik and Westbindung. It was thus, to search for example Baltikum 
connected with terms as as Ostpolitik, Westbindung, Russia, energy and energy security, 
dialogue, interlocking, solidarity, security concerns, alliance and NATO. The goal was 
to get sources that allow to see how the norms of change through rapprochement by 
Ostpolitik and solidarity by Westbindung are emphasized in relation to the Baltic states 
in the time period of 2010 until 2014 and from 2014 (more precise after the annexation 
of Crimea) until today. The focus on this time period is made in the consideration that 
the protocols from 2010 to 2014 are representative for the period since 2004. 
Accordingly this study refers for the period 1/2010 to 12/2016 in total to 23 Bundestag 
debate protocols of which14 protocols are from 2010 to2013 and 7 from 2014 to 2016. 
two protocols are dated before 2010 but are considered relevant because they refer to 
the Energy project of Nord Stream pipeline which continued to be issued also after 
2010. Further 14 documents from Federal Government including 7 official releases by 
the Foreign Ministry, 5 by the Chancellery and one by the Defence Ministry. Since this 
study aims to capture the general way of thinking and argumentation on German 
domestic level, it is important to have a time balance in the cross temporal comparison. 
By that it follows in the understanding of constructivist foreign policy models the goal 
to outline the intersubjective shared and precise expectations in the Bundestag on 
German foreign policy action and thus, the prioritization of a competing norm in 
German Baltic policy. 
After the dominant norm before and after the Annexation of Crimea is outlined it is to 
look if there is a change in the prioritization of the norm over time. If, as expected a 
change of norm prioritization is seen. It is then to compare how the norm-prioritization 
is able to explain the previously captured changes in German Baltic policy. In a 
summary, it is to explain what are the driving factors and arguments that caused a 
prioritization of a norm. Based on the theoretical approach of constructivism it is 
suggested that the higher the intersubjectivity and the preciseness of appropriate action 
in parliamentary debates is towards one of the competing norms of change through 
rapprochement or western solidarity the more likely the Government action reflect the 
prioritization of the norm in its foreign policy actions towards the Baltic states before 
and after the annexation of Crimea.  
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4. German Baltic policy before and after the annexation of Crimea 
 
In the following cross temporal case comparison before and after 2014 the 
developments of economic cooperation, diplomacy and security cooperation between 
Germany and the Baltic states will be outlined. The cross-temporal case comparison 
provides the first general overview how Germany carries out its foreign policy towards 
the Baltic states in the balance of the competing norms of change through 
rapprochement (Ostpolitik) and western Solidarity (Westbindung) since 2004 when 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the EU and NATO. The captured actions are 
underlined and supported by statements of the Federal Government representatives and 
give the first insight how Germany’s approach towards the Baltic states reflect the 
foreign policy principles of Ostpolitik and Westbindung. 
 
4.1 German Baltic policy 2010-2014 
 
Since 2004 when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the EU and NATO the bilateral 
relations and cooperation with Germany widened in many different policy fields and the 
partnership on multilateral level is characteristic for the German approach towards the 
three Baltic states. 
   
4.1.1 Economic cooperation – In light of increasing trade  
According to the United Nations Comtrade Database which collects official trade 
statistics from all around the world, the export rates between Baltic states and Germany 
increased steadily since 2004 when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the EU and the 
European Single market. The database reveals that the total exports from the Baltic 
states to Germany (Graph 1)
111
 increased from around 2 Billion USD in 2004 to around 
3, 4 Billion USD in 2015. This development was shortly interrupted in 2008-2009 with 
a total export of 2, 7 Billion USD in a result of the financial crisis but the decline was 
moderate and in 2010 the pre-crisis level was already passed with around 3,4 Billion 
USD. After a short increase again in 2011, the exports remained steady until 2014. Most 
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significant increases are in the exports from Lithuania which doubled from around 1 
Billion USD in 2004 to around 2 Billion USD in 2015. Notable is the remarkable export 
rate of 2,5 Billion USD in 2011 just after the financial Crisis. The effects of the 
financial crisis indeed are overall very moderate and the exports of Estonia and Latvia 
remained more stable with a slight increase to 1 Billion USD from Latvia and around 
700 Mill USD from Estonia in 2011. 
Similarly, the overall German export to the Baltic states (graph 2) show an increase but 
with more fluctuation compared to the exports of the Baltic states. The German exports 
to the Baltic states increased from around 3,8 Billion USD in 2004 to around 6,5 Billion 
USD in 2015. The main goods Germany exports to the Baltic states are all kind of 
machinery and equipment, transportation vehicles and chemical products.
112
 The 
Financial crisis in 2008-2009 had a significant impact on the exports but recovered 
quickly and in 2014 the pre-crisis level was achieved again with around 7,6 billion 
USD. The region is of comparatively small significance for Germany’s economy but 
Germany, in turn, became one of the most important trade partners for the Baltic states 
and for example was ranked as Estonia's fourth most important trading partner in 
2014.
113
 
Beside the increasing exports the stable finance policy of the Baltic states during the 
economic crisis since 2008 finds high respect in Germany. The German Minister of 
Finance Schäuble outlined that in light of the finance and debt crisis in Greece the 
Baltic states are a great example for all EU member states how structural reforms can be 
successful.
114
 Also Federal Chancellor Merkel expressed her appreciation of the low 
public debts of Estonia and the consistent reform course.
115
 The consistent and stable 
economic development of the Baltic states goes from Germany’s point of view hand in 
hand with the positive development in bilateral and regional cooperation and supports 
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the idea of increasing economic cooperation. Further the positive development is for 
Germany also due to the importance of the dialog with Russia, especially in energy 
cooperation. Despite the importance of the Baltic states in the common EU decision-
making process during the financial crisis Merkel put particular focus on the better 
integration of the Baltic states in the European Energy market and the increasing 
economic cooperation with Russia.
116
 The importance of the development of a common 
Energy market for Germany is seen in Merkel’s previous visit in 2008 in Estonia and 
Lithuania. This visit was held under the circumstances of the Georgian crisis and 
despite her announced concerns of the Russian Parliaments behavior and claims to 
President Medvedev, she pointed out that the dialog with Russia remains important and 
for example the energy project of the North Stream pipeline will continue normally 
despite increasing Problems with Russia because it is an “important European strategic 
project.”117 This underlines how Germany sees the development of German-Baltic 
economic relations not only within the whole BSR but also with the cooperation with 
Russia. 
 
4.1.2 Diplomacy – a common European mission 
Besides the economic cooperation, the bilateral relations between Germany and the 
three Baltic states have for both high symbolic meaning with references to a long shared 
history and cultural exchange which is also indicated by frequent visits. Since 2004 
Germany and the Baltic states have strong and widespread cooperation within EU and 
regional cooperation policy frameworks like the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
(EUSBSR) and especially on fields of technology, agriculture and environment 
protection just to mention few policy fields.
118
 Accordingly, not only Federal 
Government representatives were frequently visiting Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania but 
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also Ministers of Federal State Governments (Bundesländer) and representatives of the 
Bundestag such as the President of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert in 2011 and earlier 
in 2008.
119
 The strong connection and cooperation to the Federal states characterizes the 
bilateral cooperation in economy and other policy fields especially in regional 
cooperation of the Baltic Sea Region. For example, the Minister-Presidents of the state 
Schleswig-Holstein T. Albig and Saxony S. Tilich visited Estonia in 2013.
120
 The 
numerous and different visits indicate that Germany perceived their relation to the 
Baltic states within European structures and multilateral formats. This was underlined 
also by Merkel when she visited Lithuania and Latvia in 2010. She emphasized the 
importance of the Baltic states in the EU policy and Eastern Neighborhood. Further, the 
Foreign Ministers of Germany and the Baltic states have since 1994 an annual B3+1 
consultation where they discuss bilateral, European and international issues.
121
 
The EU internal cooperation means, in particular, the increasing cooperation in the 
Baltic Sea Region. The Council of the Baltic Sea States CBSS provides a strong and 
widespread network for transnational cooperation not only for politicians but especially 
for professional from the economy, energy, environment as well as education and 
culture. Germany took the chairmanship of the CBSS in July 2011.
122
 One main focus 
during the chairmanship was the modernization initiatives for the southeast part of the 
BSR. Here especially the partnerships with Russia played an important role and in 
particular within energy cooperation like the Nord Stream pipeline. For Merkel, the 
BSR would “exert its economic dynamism by placing ‘common ground in the spotlight’ 
and thus, freeing up ‘competitiveness and economic growth’.”123 Germany sees 
therefore, the economic cooperation as an integral part of improving the regional 
development and common understandings and values. The Baltic states as a partner of 
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the BSR are seen in the broader context and the long historical connection between 
Germany and the Baltic states are today reflected in the effort to promote the good 
partnership within the whole BSR. The diplomatic dimension of German Baltic policy 
for the time period of 2010-2014 therefore, can be seen as the promotion of regional 
development and the economic and political interlocking on regional level.  
 
4.1.3 Security cooperation – In signs of restraint 
As mentioned the German security cooperation and use of military forces is highly 
restricted and is carried out only in multilateral formations. As shown the security 
cooperation with the Baltic states is here understood within NATO structures. Since 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the NATO, the Alliance provides necessary 
aircraft and assets to support the air policing in the Baltic states. Even though the three 
Baltic states started already in 1994 to coordinate the surveillance activity of the radars 
on their territories with the established Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), 
the Baltic states Air Forces have no own armed aircraft to protect their own air space.
124
 
Therefore, the NATO launched the Baltic Air Policing which is designed as a peacetime 
mission and is implemented through a collective task sharing with the responsibility for 
the protection of the airspace in rotating periods of four months between the Alliance 
partner countries. The Mission was at the beginning mainly carried out from the Šiauliai 
Air Base in Lithuania and was extended in 2014 to the Ämari Air Base in Estonia which 
since then is also used for air policing assets.
125
 
Germany is involved in the Mission from the very beginning and since 2005 has taken 
rotating responsibility for the Mission several times until 2012. The first contingent was 
sent in July to September 2005.
126
 Since then Germany was frequently involved and last 
time in January 2012.
127
 Together with Poland and USA, Germany is seen as one of the 
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most important providers of troops and material for the Baltic Air Policing mission.
128
 
The multilateral NATO operation of Air Policing is the only noticed security 
cooperation between Germany and Baltic states. As will be shown in the parliamentary 
debates the common European security cooperation is nevertheless an issue. In relation 
to the Baltic states however, Germany did not show clear activity outside the Air 
policing mission. Thus, the Federal Ministry of Defence for example gives in relation to 
the Baltic states only information about Germany’s involvement in the Air policing 
mission. Also, the archives of the Bundestag do not reveal information about any other 
military cooperation or even actual operations in the period of 2010 to 20015 which 
would require a parliamentary approval. Accordingly, Air Policing Baltic was the only 
security cooperation since 2004 between Germany and the Baltic states that found 
attention and where Baltic states were mentioned in Germany’s foreign and security 
policy. 
 
4.1.4 Conclusion 
To summarize the overall approach of Germany towards the Baltic states shows only 
partially a direct bilateral cooperation but more the consideration of multilateral 
cooperation like in the EU policy framework for the BSR. The increasing cooperation 
within the BSR and EU policy frameworks indicate the importance to include Russia in 
the process of economic and further political and social development. The visits of 
Merkel in 2010 and the annual B3+1 Consultations of the four Foreign Ministers 
indicate that the economic cooperation and stable finance policy are of main 
importance. The EU strategy for the BSR and the CBSS are important instruments for 
the cooperation with the Baltic states and the inclusion of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
into the European Energy market. Especially the Nord Stream pipeline show that 
Germany promoted strongly the development of shared markets to create a political 
stability and good relations to Russia. The minimized military cooperation to the 
peacetime mission of Air Policing without any other notable security cooperation 
indicate further how the priority setting in the German Baltic policy is more towards 
energy and economic security and the connection of  the two features. The necessity of 
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the Air policing is for Germany out of question but it avoids referring to potential 
threats from Russia and sees it as an overall peacetime airspace securitization. 
 
German Baltic policy before the annexation of Crimea 
 Economic 
cooperation 
Diplomacy Security 
cooperation 
German Baltic 
policy in Pre-
Crimean time 
- Increasing exports 
- Nord Stream 
pipeline 
- Focus on stable 
finance policy 
- Focus on regional 
cooperative formats 
with Russia 
- Focus on stable 
finance policy and 
the dialogue on 
BSR and EU level. 
- Regular 
participation in 
rotation mission of 
Air Policing since 
2005. 
- Reserved position 
in NATO and 
emphasis on the 
dialogue with 
Russia. 
 
 
4.2 German Baltic policy since 2014 
 
During the end of the year 2013 and the beginning of 2014 Germany realized that the 
Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea will have an impact on its overall relations 
and approach towards the Baltic states and the circumstances the relations have to be 
considered in becoming more decisive in the understanding of German Baltic policy. 
 
4.2.1 Economic cooperation –Declining trade in the crisis 
After the EU imposed the first financial sanctions towards Russia in July 2014 and 
expanded them in September of the same year the German exports to Russia (graph 3) 
have declined rapidly from 71 Billion USD in 2013 to around 40 Billion USD (2015) 
and by that has reached the lowest export rate since 2004.
129
 These imposed sanctions 
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are insofar interesting as Germany willingly agreed on them and tolerate a decrease in 
economic relations with Russia which contradicts with the principles of Ostpolitik. 
Notable here is now that also German exports to the Baltic states decreased from 7,6 
Billion USD (2014) to 6,5 Billion USD (2015). Also, the exports from the Baltic states 
to Germany decreased from around 4 Billion USD (2014) to 3,4 Billion USD. This 
indicates that the trade with Baltic states was connected to the, for Germany much more 
important Russian market. For example, the transport of EU goods between the Baltic 
ports and Russia was highly affected by the EU sanctions towards Russia. This, 
however, did not affect the overall economic growth in the Baltic states itself.
130
 
 
While the positive development of economic cooperation in the last 15 years was seen 
in increasing trades the consequences of the Ukraine crisis caused a significant decline 
in German-Baltic trade. Since this decreasing economic cooperation, partly self-
inflicted by Germany when it agreed on economic sanctions towards Russia, indicates 
that Germany consciously distanced itself from the norm of change through 
rapprochement and economic interlocking which further would suggest that in the 
Baltic policy Germany should be in favour of showing solidarity with the Baltic states 
and adopt a more costly foreign policy to respond to the security concerns of the Baltic 
states and strengthen the bilateral relations. In the following sections, we see that the 
decreased trade volume did indeed not mean that the cooperation on other fields 
declined as well. Notable is that since 2014 the regional cooperation formats such as the 
CBSS are not in the focus of German Baltic policy on Federal Government level 
anymore. This suggests that economy is not a driving factor and the cooperation on 
other fields actually show an increase which cannot be tracked back on rational, or more 
precise on material considerations because it would suggest that with declining trade the 
cooperation overall should decline. The diplomatic and especially security cooperation 
between Germany and the Baltic states after since 2014 suggest, as will be shown a shift 
towards the norm of western solidarity. 
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4.2.2 Diplomacy -Solidarity with the Baltic states 
Since the Annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, the German Federal 
Government stresses the understanding for Baltic states security concerns and confirms 
its support and strong connection towards the Baltic states. With the concerning 
developments in Ukraine and the deterioration of EU-Russian relations, the security 
concerns of the Baltic states increased. The German Federal Government responded to 
this development and confirmed its support and solidarity as an EU and NATO partner 
with the Baltic states. Especially Merkel pointed out the partnership within the NATO 
during her visits on 18.8.2014 in Riga and 25.8.2016 in Tallinn and underlined the 
recognition of increasing security concerns in the region. Taking into account the timing 
of Merkel’s previous visits in the Baltic states in 2008 in light of the Georgian crisis and 
2010 after the financial crisis her visits in 2014 and 2016 show similar symbolic 
meaning. However, this time Merkel not only welcomed the EU partnership and Baltic 
states’ successful and stable economic development which allowed at that time also 
Latvian membership in the Eurozone, she in particular confirmed Germany’s support to 
guarantee that the infrastructure in the Baltic states shall provide a quick reaction 
towards threats.
131
 A high symbolic meaning had her visit in 2016 in Tallinn just at the 
time when the diplomatic relations between Germany and the Baltic states had their 25
th
 
anniversary day. For now 25 years, Merkel said “we belong already to the same 
European and trans-Atlantic family”132 In Tallinn Merkel further met with 
representatives of the digital economy and discussed also cyber security cooperation 
within the NATO. In reference to the NATO summit in Warsaw, she pointed out that 
Germany takes the threats for the IT-systems very seriously. That makes clear, so 
Merkel “that we stand together in any danger.”133 For Merkel this conclusion of the 
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NATO summit underlines the confession to solidarity as anchored in Article 5 of the 
NATO agreement.
134
 
The German Foreign Minister Steinmeier became the most frequent visitor and within 
2014-2016 traveled to the Baltic states six times. Besides the annual B3+1 Consultation 
Steinmeier made a strong commitment to respond to the security concerns of the Baltic 
states by making additional explixit visits. Already on 11.3.2014 few days before the 
Referendum in Crimea he traveled to all three Baltic State and stated that the Russian 
aggression in Crimea is “a mutual problem of the EU and NATO”.135 This means that 
Germany clearly refer to the western solidarity and the partnership within a value 
community. In light of the critical developments he appealed, however, to wait for the 
result of the Referendum in Crimea but pointed out already that “the Russian activity in 
regard to the Ukraine crisis makes consideration about further sanctions ‘unfortunately 
necessary’.”136 After the annexation of Crimea Steinmeier stated that it is very 
important to have a strong dialog and cooperation with the Eastern EU-partners.
137
 
In response to the present developments Steinmeier suggested a new action plan 
together with his Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Office colleagues in order to meets 
the central challenges in the Baltic states. In February 2015 Steinmeier explained that 
the action plan aims for “promoting a ‘self-confident European public society’ in the 
Baltic states”138 and to strengthen the information policy with media offers for the 
Russian minorities in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
139
 In the following visits in 2015 
and 2016 the implementation of the action plan was in particular focus and the four 
Foreign Ministers signed each individual joint statement where the strengthening of 
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bilateral relations and the cooperation in fields of media, culture, education, vocational 
education and personal connections was decided but also in security as will be shown 
below.
140
 Notable at this point is that the joint declarations are very similar in content 
and even in the wordings. Therefore, Germany remains in its overall unified approach in 
its Baltic policy. 
Besides the continuation of EU policy-oriented cooperation which also means the 
frequent meeting with other politicians and representatives from Federal states for 
example the second visit of Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein Torsten Albig in 
Estonia in 2014 the notable increase of visits especially by Foreign Minister Steinmeier 
and the particular emphasis on the NATO and EU partnership shows that the German 
Federal Governments shared concerns for security issues. Even though the further 
dialog with Russia is still on agenda, the stronger emphasis on bilateral cooperation in 
education, culture, and cyber securities support the idea that Russia is not a decisive 
factor in German-Baltic relations and the individual character of the relations is put 
forward rather than seen in the Russian context. Further the focus on strengthening 
domestic media and communication and to reach the Russian minorities shows that the 
stability and positive development of the Baltic states are not primarily promoted by 
increasing economic cooperation but in institutional and structural stability. Especially 
the cooperation in security policies is noticeable as the military cooperation since 2014 
indicate. Accordingly, the visit by German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen in 
all three Baltic states in April 2015 marks a new stage of military cooperation. 
 
4.2.3 Security cooperation –In sign of a strong Alliance 
In reaction to the increased tension in Eastern Europe followed by the Annexation of 
Crimea by Russia the NATO saw the necessity to increase its presence in the Baltic 
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states and give a clear sign towards Russia. German confirmed in the first place its 
participation in the Baltic Air Policing in regular rotation and continues with the shared 
duty after the last one in January 2012 again in September 2014 (together with Portugal, 
Canada, and the Netherlands), in August 2015 and again in on September 2016 
(together with France). 
Further Germany agreed on the implementation of a new NATO Readiness Action Plan 
which marks a turning point in German participation in military and other security 
cooperation in the Baltic states. In the NATO Wales Summit declaration from the 5
th
 of 
September 2014, the NATO Readiness Action Plan was agreed on and “includes 
immediate reinforcement of NATO’s presence (assurance measures) and longer-term 
changes to NATO’s force posture (adaptation measures).”141 Especially the adaption 
measures shall increase the “readiness and allow the Alliance to deal with any security 
challenges, including those from the east and the south.”142 The so-called assurance 
measures so the Summit “is a direct result of Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine.”143 
This means that Germany not only accepts increasing costs in security cooperation but 
is ready to take it active part to ensure Baltic states security. This is not only a turn a 
turn away from its previous approach in security cooperation but is a clear reference to 
the norm of western solidarity regardless of its material costs. 
During the B3+1 Consultations in September 2016 just after the NATO Summit in 
Warsaw Steinmeier discussed with his Official colleagues of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania the further cooperation. In the mentioned joint statements they agreed on the 
“commitment to deepening cooperation in the field of security and defence through 
continued implementation of the decision taken at the recent NATO summit in 
Warsaw.”144 Further, Steinmeier promoted his disarmament initiative which he sees as a 
consequent implementation of the NATO- strategy that since decades is based on two 
pillars: “One thing is the strengthening of our own defence efforts – the other is the 
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willingness to enter into dialogue. We have already made very concrete decisions on the 
side of deterrence. Now we have to make the side of dialogue concrete and to test what 
is possible.”145 This means that Steinmeier sees the Baltic states in a special role here 
and the above-mentioned initiatives for promoting the relations with the Russian 
minorities is of a key importance to increase also the Baltic-Russian relations.
146
 
The concrete deterrence efforts Steinmeier mentioned meant from German perspective 
the increase in material and personnel support as well as the participation in joint 
NATO military exercises. Thus, in addition to the Air Policing Germany participates 
since 2015 in joint NATO exercises such as the so-called Dragoon Ride and Saber 
Strike and Persistent Presence. Since 2011 the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) with 
NATO held the Saber Strike maneuver series in the Baltic states and Poland. This 
Maneuver is a “cooperative training exercise designed to improve joint interoperability 
through a range of missions that prepare the 13 participating nations to support 
multinational contingency operations.”147 German Armed Forces participate for the first 
time in Saber Strike-Maneuver in 2015 with 600 Soldiers. In the context of Persistent 
Presence 200 German Soldiers from the Jägerbatallion 292 of the German-French 
Brigade exercises with Lithuanian Military.
148
 During her visit in April 2015 in Vilnius 
German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen guaranteed Lithuania 12 Tanks as well 
as Fire Control systems and equipment for artillery observation.
149
 Germany is also 
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planned to take the main responsibility for the deployment of additional battalions of 
NATO in Lithuania from 2017 onward.
150
  
To conclude we see a significant increase in German willingness to participate in joint 
military exercises and to increase the readiness of the Baltic states to respond to military 
threats. At her visit in Tallinn 2016 Merkel unambiguously stated in a joint Press 
conference with the Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas that Germany meets the 
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty with the continuation of the Air Policing mission and 
supports the joint decision made in the NATO-Warsaw Summit. Accordingly, so 
Merkel “Germany will be a framing nation in Lithuania. Other will do the same in 
Estonia.”151 With these measures, so Merkel further “we show that within the Alliance 
we stand for one another“152 
 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
Overall the Baltic policy after the annexation of the Crimea indicates a significant 
emphasis on the diplomacy and security cooperation in a simultaneous lowering 
emphasis on economic relations and interlocking compared to previous years. While the 
trade between Germany and the Baltic states decreased, the intensive bilateral relations 
as such have not declined at all. Instead, many things were actually intensified even 
more such as a renewed precise definition of bilateral relation through joint statements 
of the Foreign Ministers for the cooperation to promote a confident EU public society 
and free press including independent media communication with the Russian minorities 
in the three states. This is an important symbolic point where the change in Germany’s 
approach due to the Ukraine crisis comes clear. Of high symbolic meaning was the 
emphasized of the 25
th
 anniversary of diplomatic relations as an important date to 
confirm the German-Baltic relations and partnership in EU and NATO. The most 
notable change is undoubtedly in the security cooperation. In addition to the 
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continuation of Air Policing Germany participates since 2015 in numerous NATO 
exercises like the Saber Strike operation. Germany also confirmed to take the main 
responsibility for the combat battalion in Lithuania starting from 2017 within the 
Persistent Presence and already has sent couple hundred soldiers to Lithuania to 
exercise together with the Baltic states armed forces. Further material support with 
tanks and other equipment is promised by the Minister of Defense Von der Leyen. Even 
though the economic cooperation within EU policies continued, the focus from overall 
cooperative structures with Russia shifted towards the domestic strengthening of public 
society and the institutional stability in the Baltic states as well as increasing 
cooperation in education and culture what indicate that the shared historical, cultural 
and value-based relation and exchange shall be extended. 
German Baltic policy after the annexation of Crimea 
 Economic 
cooperation 
Diplomacy Security 
cooperation 
German Baltic 
policy in Post-
Crimean time 
- Decreasing 
exports 
- strong focus on 
domestic 
strengthening  
- Integration into 
EU internal energy 
markets. 
- Joint statements 
for intensified 
cooperation. 
- Symbolic 
emphasis on the 
25
th
 anniversary of 
bilateral relations 
- In addition to Air 
Policing since 2015 
active participation 
in NATO exercises: 
Saber Strike and 
Persistent Presence. 
- Responsibility for 
combat battalion in 
Lithuania. 
- Further military 
material support 
 
4.3 Continuity and changes in German Baltic policy 
 
In the cross-temporal comparison of the periods before and after the annexation of 
Crimea we see some continuity but also significant changes in German Baltic policy. In 
economic cooperation, we notice that although the export rates decreased since 2014 the 
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importance of economic cooperation and energy policy remains overall unchanged. 
Merkel and other German representatives continued emphasizing the importance of 
integrating the Baltic states into European markets and a stable finance policy. Also the 
energy security remains as well of high priority through all the time and is even more 
stressed after the Crimean Crisis. Russia as an important energy supplier is 
unquestioned even in light of the economic sanctions and deteriorated relations between 
EU and Russia. However, the importance of economic cooperation experienced a 
change in its role and influence on regional stability and bilateral relations. 
Thus, in diplomacy we see a change in the language and symbolic messages of German 
Federal Government visits in the Baltic states. While Germany and the Baltic states 
always referred strongly to their shared history and culture, we see that before 2014 
Germany particularly stresses the importance of economic cooperation also with Russia 
and promotes the Baltic states to be a link between East and West also in energy 
policies. After March 2014 the focus is more on the domestic development and stability 
of the Baltic states. This stronger bilateral or EU internal focus is seen in joint 
agreements signed by the Foreign Ministers with the aim to increase bilateral relations 
and focus especially on strengthening public society and the integration of the Russian 
minority in the Baltic states. The implementation of the resulting action plan promoted 
by Steinmeier and his frequent visits is characteristic for Germany’s changed approach. 
The most significant change is in the security cooperation where Germany committed 
itself as an active and essential NATO partner after being more passive before 2014. 
Since the NATO membership of the Baltic states in 2004 Germany was from the very 
beginning involved in the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission and continues it up today. 
The last two rotating responsibilities since 2014 were together with other NATO 
partners also to emphasize the unrestricted solidarity by the whole Alliance. Until 2014 
Germany, however, did not participate in other NATO combat exercises such as the 
annual Saber strike exercise By the US Military Forces which takes place in the Baltic 
states since 2011. After the annexation of Crimea the need for immediate security 
measures became evident and Germany gave no doubts of its solidarity. Accordingly, 
Germany’s participation in addition to the ongoing Air policing was extended to the 
participation on Saber Strike in 2015 and 2016 (in addition to Dragoon Ride) as well as 
the deployment of Soldiers in Lithuania and the responsibility for additional NATO 
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Battalion in Lithuania starting from 2017. Germany also agreed on the new NATO 
Readiness Action Plan which not only included the short term assurance measures in 
immediate response to Russian aggressions in Ukraine but also the adaptation measures 
to ensure the quick response on any threats in the Baltic states. The following graph 
summarized in one view the German Baltic policy areas before and after the annexation 
of the Crimea by Russia: 
 
Summary of German Baltic policy before and after the annexation of Crimea 
 Economic 
cooperation 
Diplomacy Security 
cooperation 
Before annexation 
of Crimean 
- Increasing exports 
- Nord Stream 
pipeline 
- Focus on stable 
finance policy 
 
 
- Focus on 
cooperative formats 
with Russia 
- Focus on stable 
finance policy and 
the dialogue on BSR 
and EU level. 
- Regular 
participation in 
rotation mission of 
Air Policing since 
2005. 
- Reserved position 
in NATO and 
emphasis on the 
dialogue with 
Russia. 
After annexation of 
Crimea 
- Decreasing exports 
- strong focus on 
domestic 
strengthening  
- Integration into EU 
internal energy 
markets. 
- Joint statements for 
intensified 
cooperation. 
- Symbolic emphasis 
on 25
th
 anniversary 
of bilateral relations 
- In addition to Air 
Policing since 2015 
active participation 
in NATO exercises: 
Saber Strike and 
Persistent Presence 
- Responsibility for 
combat battalion in 
Lithuania 
- Further military 
material support 
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In the following chapter, the changes in the German Baltic policy will be explained in 
the shift in prioritization of foreign policy norms, as visible in the the parliamentary 
debate of the Bundestag. As the constructivist approach suggests the analysis of 
parliamentary debates shows how the domestic way of thinking and language in issues 
related to the Baltic states and the references to foreign policy norms play a significant 
role to understand the developments shown above. Accordingly, the changes in 
diplomacy and security cooperation and the different perceived importance of economic 
cooperation and thus, material factors for the bilateral relations should be reflected in 
the normative argumentation in the Bundestag. 
  
51 
 
5. Parliamentary debates –norm prioritization in German Baltic 
policy 
 
The cross-temporal case comparison of German Baltic policy before and after the 
annexation of Crimea reveals significant changes which in the following section will be 
explained by parliamentary debates and protocols of the German Bundestag. These 
protocols are searched from the online archive of the Bundestag by keywords that refer 
to the Baltic states. Firstly the search was done by the keywords of Baltikum and 
Baltische staaten. To provide a sufficient amount of sources the search was extended to 
keywords where Baltic states are expected to be explicitly or implicitly mentioned. Such 
keywords are Ostpolitik, Westbindung (to refer directly to the foreign policy norms), 
Estland, Lettland, Litauen, Ostseeraum, Ostseerat (to grasp the general way of thinking 
and language the three states and the BSR are considered). 
Based on the constructivist assumption that norms are likely to determine foreign policy 
actions it is in following to explain if the changes in German Baltic policy before and 
since 2014 correlates with the shared value based expectations of appropriate behavior 
expressed in the German Bundestag. If, as assumed norms are likely to determine 
German Baltic policy the parliamentary debate will show that the Governments actions 
go back to the, from Boekle described (1) wide agreement within parliamentary fraction 
(intersubjectivity), (2) agreement on appropriate actions (preciseness) and (3) perception 
of which circumstances led to the changes (counterfactual validity). As will be shown 
the parliamentary debate indicate a shift in the normative expectations of Governments 
actions within German-Baltic relations and thus, show that the prioritization of norms 
explain the changes in German Baltic policy before and after the annexation of Crimea. 
 
5.1 Norm of Ostpolitik and Westbindung before 2014 
 
For the period before 2014, the results for the keyword ‘Baltikum’ and ‘Baltische 
Staaten’ for protocols and parliamentary debates are very rare. Mostly the Bundestag 
records provided for this time period few written questions from parliamentary 
opposition towards the governmental coalition and their fraction which are related for 
example on the economic and ecological consequences of the Nord Stream pipeline 
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from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea and several trade routes for shipping. 
This initially indicates that the Baltic states indeed are considered in a broader context 
of regional and EU context.
153
 This is insofar consistent with Germany’s approach 
towards the Baltic states before the annexation of Crimea as the Baltic states were 
mostly considered within regional and EU context. For example, the parliamentary 
debates and protocols reveal that Baltikum and Baltische staaten were mentioned 
exclusively in the context of economic structures and development in the BSR. In the 
context of the Nord Stream pipeline, the Baltic states (or Baltikum) were exclusively 
mentioned in the context of participation in the decision making process, integration 
into pipeline route, other Baltic Sea Region states and consultations within BSR formats 
such as Helsinki Commission, Baltic Sea region Energy Cooperation (BASREC) and 
Baltic 21.
154
 Especially the ecological consequences and the energy security concerns of 
the Baltic states and other Baltic Sea Region states were emphasized. In the 
parliamentary debate the Federal Government, however, represented  more the high 
importance of the Nord Stream pipeline for the future energy security in Europe. 
Negative political consequences and any security concerns by the Baltic states were 
explained with insufficient information policy which according to the Government was 
not a matter of political representatives but of the private economy sector and 
companies involved in the pipeline project.
155
 In other words the Federal Government 
actually noticed the energy security concerns of the Baltic states but aimed to solve 
these issues within multilateral meetings of the BSR countries and emphasized the 
economic benefits of the pipeline. That indicates that the Government saw the economic 
development and energy and other security issues connected and suggests a priority 
towards the norm of change through rapprochement and thus, refer to the logic of 
Ostpolitik. 
The Baltic states were mentioned once in a document about Ecological consequences of 
the planned Baltic Sea pipeline and the testing of alternative routes.
156
 were the 
parliamentary opposition mentioned a proposal made by Poland and the Baltic states to 
use a land route for the Nord Stream pipeline for example by creating additional 
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capacity for the Yamal pipeline or the use of the existing Amber pipeline which, so the 
argument are in economical and ecological sense better than the irresponsible route 
through the already highly endangered Baltic Sea.
157
 
Beside the Nord Stream pipeline, also other economic projects in the Baltic Sea Region 
were discussed in the Bundestag. For example, another request by the Greens on the 
18.4.2011 was about impacts of the planned fifth lock in the Kiel Canal on 
transshipping inter alia to the Baltic states.
158
 There the Baltic states were explicitly 
mentioned in the fifth questions “how high is the transshipping traffic of the ports of 
Hamburg, Bremerhaven, and Rotterdam from and to the Baltic states via the Kiel 
Canal?”159 and the sixth question “to what extend the construction of the Jade-Weser 
port as a transshipment hub from and to the Baltic states via the Kiel Canal was 
considered in the planning of the new lock?”160 The Governments response to the first 
question was that there are no current data about the transshipping traffic but it would 
have been analyzed how the transshipping would develop.
161
 To the second question, 
the Government just said that such considerations were made.
162
 The partly quite 
general answers of the Federal Government in the parliamentary protocols underlines 
that the economic cooperation with the Baltic states is mostly considered in the broader 
context of the Baltic Sea Region. For example the three states were mentioned in the 
context of the freedom of movement of workers in the European Union that was 
implemented on 1.5.2011 for the Baltic states and other Eastern European countries and 
what consequences it might have for the labor market in Germany. Gitta Connemann 
(CDU/CSU criticized the opposition that “what kind of picture you are drawing for 
people from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (…)? I find it scandalous”163 a scenario where 
the freedom of labor movement would take away Germans workplaces and said “for our 
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neighbors it must raise the feeling of not being welcome.”164 Also, we see the German 
approach towards the Baltic states integration into European energy market, as Merkel 
promoted in her visits in 2008 and 2010 and the importance of cooperative structures in 
the BSR and with Russia find intersubjectively shared expectation in the Bundestag. 
 
The Integration of Baltic states into European energy market and the strong economic 
interlocking within the BSR was also substantial in the diplomatic relations. As above 
mentioned Merkel’s visit in Lithuania and Estonia in 2008 underline this German 
multilateral approach. Notable here is that during her visit in 2008 the Georgian crisis 
was at hand and even though Merkel criticized the Russian actions and with that shared 
the international critique, she saw no need to adjust the German policy towards the 
Baltic states but remained in the approach to emphasize the dialogue with Russia. The 
Georgian crisis has no impact on the ongoing, from Merkel’s view, important European 
strategic project of the North Stream pipeline which was underlined also by the 
President of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert in Lithuania and Estonia in Mai 2011 who 
promoted the development of sustainable energy policy in Europe.
165
 
This strong reference to the economic cooperation and importance of Russian inclusion 
in order to promote a common security in the BSR and entire Europe indicate that the 
norm of change through rapprochement was prioritized. Since the results for searching 
with the keyword ‘Baltische staaten’ and ‘Baltikum’ are rare and do not provide 
sufficient insight for the norm prioritization of German Baltic policy, the search was 
extended with keywords in which the Baltic states might be implicitly be mentioned. 
Accordingly, further keywords were ‘Ostpolitik’, ‘Ostseeraum’, ‘Otseerat’, ‘Estland’, 
‘Lettland’ and ‘Litauen’. The aim was to grasp the general way of thinking in the 
Bundestag related to issues that directly or indirectly concern the Baltic states and could 
be attributed to the foreign policy norms of change through rapprochement and/or 
solidarity. 
The extended search reveals that the overall emphasis on cooperative structures in the 
BSR is seen in the broader policy framework of Ostpolitik. By searching protocols with 
the keyword ‘Ostpolitik’ 14 protocols were found. Most of them dealt with the future of 
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cooperative structures with Russia and its high importance for Germany in light of 
globalization. Accordingly, the prioritization of Ostpolitik in the BSR characterizes the 
overall way of thinking in the German Bundestag. In the parliamentary debate on 
15.12.2011 about democratic movements in Russia Franz Thönnes (SPD) said that “in 
the core of this policy [Ostpolitik] change through rapprochement still applies and today 
especially in Russia.”166 In the following years, Russia remains in main focus when it 
came to the cooperation in Eastern European region. A request by the Social Democrats 
about the ‘modernization partnership with Russia –common security in Europe through 
stronger cooperation and interlocking is a good example. It is not surprising that 
particularly the Social Democrats emphasize the importance of German-Russian 
relations. In 2010 the German Federal Government was still formed by the coalition of 
Christ Democratic Union CDU/CSU and the Liberal Party FDP. The Social Democrats 
demand in Thönnes words a “comprehensive modernization partnership with Russia as 
a touchstone for the Common Foreign- and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European 
Union.”167 This explains the German restricted security cooperation before 2014 
because according to Ostpolitik and change through rapprochement the economic and 
security issues are connected and Russia is of essential importance. It means that a 
unified EU-Ostpolitik is necessary for its initiative to coordinate the different regional 
policy frameworks such as the ‘Eastern Partnership’, ‘Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region’ and others.168 Despite this claim came from the at that time opposition it refers 
also to what Merkel promoted in her visits in 2008 and 2010 in the Baltic states that the 
importance of cooperative structures in the Baltic Sea region and with Russia is of high 
importance. In April 2013 the Social Democrats referred once more to the Ostpolitik 
during a debate about no visa freedoms for holders of Russian Service passports but for 
people from the West Balkans and that it would not be helpful to put hurdles for 
cooperation and freedom of movements too high because “otherwise the strategy of 
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Willy Brandts Ostpolitik with the strategy of change through rapprochement would not 
have been so successful as it turned out to be.”169 
 
An essential debate about Germany's foreign policy in the future was held on 10.2.2012 
where the shaping of globalization was discussed in the Bundestag. Here the validity of 
both Ostpolitik and Westbindung was confirmed by the Foreign Minister Westerwelle 
(FDP): “like the new Ostpolitik did not question the Westintegration the today’s turning 
towards new partners is not a questioning of previous partnerships.”170 In the case of the 
Baltic states, it would mean that while both norms are of equal validity the previous 
statements make clear that it is dependent on the context whether one norm is to be 
prioritized over the other. Westerwelle, as well as other representatives of the Federal 
Government, however, did not explicitly specify in case of the Baltic states or even on 
BSR level which norm is to be prioritized. The emphasis on the importance of 
partnership with Russia, in turn, indicates that Germany prioritized Ostpolitik with the 
norm of change through rapprochement when it came to the cooperation in the BSR and 
the relations to the Baltic states. 
Further searches with the keywords Estland, Lettland and Litauen underline the broader 
approach and connection to the relations to Russia and the overall BSR. The already 
mentioned freedom of movement of workers was one of the most noticeable debates. 
Here we see as well the consideration of the Baltic states in broader developments 
within the EU. While Russia is not directly an issue, the economic factors and the 
impact on the internal market were decisive. Overall it is to notice that Germany’s 
approach towards the Baltic states before 2014 shows no explicit reference to a norm. 
Nevertheless, the relatively low attention towards these states and mention in the 
broader context of economic and regional cooperation suggests that the norm of 
Ostpolitik was more likely been prioritized. Or, the behavior that was to follow from the 
norm did not stand in contradiction to the behavioural expectations that stem from 
solidarity with the Baltic states. Even though the parliamentary debates do not reveal 
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explicit connection of the norm “change through rapprochement” and the Baltic states 
the results for the searches in this study allow the conclusion that the economic 
interlocking and development of regional cooperation to promote security in Europe 
refers to the norm of Ostpolitik as above defined. 
This conclusion additionally supported by the fact that Germany’s participation in the 
joint NATO Baltic Air Policing mission since 2004 is not particularly debated in the 
Bundestag before 2014. The only mention of the Baltic states in context of NATO and 
Air Policing in the Bundestag was made by Merkel in Mai 2012 just before the NATO-
Summit in Camp David on 20.-21.5.2012.
171
 There she pointed out the necessity for the 
Air policing insofar as the Baltic states can use their own resources on other skills 
instead of built up additionally the own Air Forces.
172
 Since the Air Policing is a joint 
NATO mission within the territory of the alliance, an approval of the Bundestag is not 
required. However, it is notable that also the not participation in other NATO exercises 
such as Saber Strike before 2014 was also not debated. Instead the strengthening of 
European security foreign and security policy was debated for example in the general 
debate on 29.3.2012.
173
 There Hans-Peter Bartels (SPD) pointed out that with the 
increasing of European common security cooperation and with other NATO partners 
should be improved “because it do not make sense that states with a population of 1 
million built up their own Air Force. This task can be done alternately.”174 Further the 
joint training of military forces, so Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU/CSU) should be 
coordinated in order to make it more cost-efficient.
175
 This supports the assumption that 
the German restrained an increasing activity in joint NATO exercises in the Baltic states 
was seen also in the Bundestag as not appropriate and necessary. The increasing 
coordination and improvement of European military forces instead should be developed 
in order to make it more cost-efficient. While the alliance solidarity as such was never 
questioned the actual activity show the validity of the solidarity norms, but do not 
require active participation under existing circumstances before 2014. The economic 
consideration and security need are here always mentioned together which therefore, 
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indicate the prioritization of the norm of change through rapprochement and thus, the 
principle of Ostpolitik in German Baltic policy. 
    
Overall the picture we get from the German Baltic policy before 2014 is that the 
continuation of Ostpolitik with cooperative features is the prioritized norm. Based on 
these finding in the parliamentary debates we can say that the intersubjectively shared 
expectation of reasonable behavior was more towards multilateral connection with the 
Baltic states. The Federal Government acted according to this norm without completely 
denying the interests of the Baltic states but considered them mostly on the multilateral 
level. Insofar the German Government takes also into account the norm of solidarity but 
prioritize the multilateral formats which are more likely towards the norm of ‘change 
through rapprochement’. The diplomatic relations also underline the multilateral 
understanding of these relations and the focus on dialogue with Russia was always 
raised in visits and statements. Even without actually mentioning Russia the domestic 
intersubjective perception seems to be that Baltic states are dealt within BSR and thus, 
also in relation to Russia. At the same time, we can also infer that without explicit 
mentioning, the Baltic states fall under EU, many policies are therefore, covered at the 
EU level. The Baltic states are not considered individually, but are addressed through 
these multilateral formats. Also here we see that while the priority on interlocking and 
the multilateral level was prioritized the economic cooperation was promoted via the 
strengthening overall regional and EU structures. 
 
When it comes to security issues and cooperation within the NATO or other formats, 
the records of the Bundestag show, that the Air Policing mission was the only security 
cooperation, that was mentioned more detailed. This, however, did not lead to actual 
debates within the Bundestag because despite the fraction DIE LINKE, which refuses 
the NATO overall and represents the view that Germany shall get out of NATO and 
even supports the complete dissolution of the Alliance, the Air Policing mission as a 
peacetime mission is officially not a response to a particular threat namely on the part of 
Russia but is an general securing of Baltic states airspace. The obvious passive and 
minimized participation and the missing parliamentary debate clearly indicate that the 
prioritization of Ostpolitik as driving norm in German Baltic policy was evident 
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5.2 Rebalancing of Ostpolitik and Westbindung since 2014 
 
While the parliamentary documents before March 2014 reveal a comparatively low 
frequency in relation to the Baltic states the debates after the Crimean crisis result in an 
increasing attention towards the changing circumstances. Most of the documents the 
Bundestag records reveal for the period 2014-2016 are exclusively connected to the 
Ukraine crisis, NATO, and changing security circumstances. Alone during the 
parliamentary debate on 13.3.2014,
176
 20.3.2014
177
 and 3.4.2014
178
 so just at the time of 
the annexation of Crimea by Russia the Baltic states were in total particularly 
mentioned around seven times. While parliamentary documents in 2015 emphasized 
more the NATO and Germany’s role in it. The most frequent mentions of Baltic states 
was in 2016 when the implementation of a new NATO Action Plan was to be decided. 
Consequently, the Baltic states are mentioned in the parliamentary debate on 7.7.2016 
more than 15 times. The Baltic states are mostly mentioned in the context of increasing 
security concerns, Germany’s solidarity with its allies and common values and 
European and NATO partnership. The very first one to mention the Baltic states was 
Rolf Mützenich (SPD) on 13.3.2014 who said in the context of the previous meeting of 
EU leaders on 6.3.2014 about the situation in Ukraine that it would be appropriate to 
say it is foreseeable that the events in Ukraine and Crimea and the changing relations 
with Russia mean that “tensions in Europe will unfortunately grow again.”179 Especially 
from German view, Mützenich further “we have done a great deal to help the relaxation 
policy to be successful and finally reach a change in policy behaviour”180 For him it is 
obvious that this crisis have different levels where not only the Ukraine is affected but 
also other states with Russian minorities such as Bulgaria and the Baltic states where 
concerns and insecurity might increase.
181
 These are countries who would feel their 
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security challenged by the international situation and the visit of the Foreign Minister in 
the Baltic states underline this consciousness.
182
 
 
In the parliamentary debate on the 20.3.2014, the Baltic states were mentioned four 
times and always in the context of the increasing security concerns. The parliamentary 
director of the CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction Manfred Grund said that “we know about 
the fears in the Baltic states, Poland, Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova”183 and 
the Baltic states, so his argument, would have joined the NATO especially because of 
the fear of a Russian aggression.
184
 The concerns of the eastern partners should be taken 
serious, so Anita Schäfer (CDU/CSU): “The core idea of the NATO as a security 
alliance against threats in Europe is gaining increasing importance.”185 This is a 
remarkable statement since for the first time in the case of Baltic policy the German 
Bundestag called the NATO publicly as the crucial security guarantee in Europe. In the 
parliamentary session on 3.4. 2014 this perception was confirmed once more inter alia 
by Hans-Peter Uhl (CSU) by saying that “the march of Russian forces on Russia’s 
western frontier in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in the Baltic states led to 
great and intelligible concerns. They are expected to be protected, protected from 
NATO and no one else.”186 During the parliamentary debate on 7.7.2016 in light of the 
upcoming NATO-Warsaw Summit on 8.-9.7.2016 particular attention got the role of the 
Alliance in the Baltic states and the German perception of Russian intentions in that 
region. This parliamentary debate was the most important one in relation to German 
Baltic policy after 2014 and MPs, as said, mentioned the Baltic states 15 times and 
exclusively in context of increased security concerns and the intention of Germany to 
show solidarity with the Baltic states and support them and thus, refer to the norm of 
western solidarity. Merkel alone referred to the Baltic states three times by stating that 
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all 28 member states of the NATO such as the Baltic states since 2004 can 
independently decide their membership within the NATO and share the same goals and 
values of our community.
187
 The second mention was that “the core issue is to enable a 
stronger NATO presence in the Baltic states (...)”188 and thirdly that the NATO plans 
“intend to have a multilaterally composed presence. Where in each of the three Baltic 
states and Poland one ally take the leading responsibility to ensure the NATO 
presence.”189 Merkel’s and Christ Democrats coalition partner of the Social Democrats 
who are traditionally proponents of the Ostpolitik also shared this view as Thomas 
Oppermann (SPD) pointed out that Russian annexation of Crimea was against 
international law and military maneuvers by Russia with thousands of soldiers at border 
areas would increase the fear of Poland and the Baltic states.
190
 Further he says that “the 
collective security alliance [NATO] is for us and particularly for the Baltic states (...) a 
guarantee for security.”191 His Party colleague Niels Annen notices that while 
Germany’s commitment to the NATO within different operations such as Air Policing, 
the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and other measures would be a “clear 
commitment to the security of the Baltic states.”192 Nevertheless, also the dialogue with 
Russia must from Annen’s view serve the security within the alliance and he “would 
sometimes wish that the “colleagues in the Baltic states would once take note of it.”193 
Wolfgang Hellmich also from SPD rewarded Merkel’s statement for the efforts German 
soldiers make in the Baltic states and elsewhere within the NATO which is “on one 
hand a part of diplomatic dialogues and on the other hand the efforts to strengthen the 
alliance’s ability to defend.”194 From the CDU/CSU fraction Henning Otte emphasized 
once more that “our partners in the Baltic states (...) are concerned about the integrity of 
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their state territory. We in Germany can emphasize with that.”195 For him it is obvious 
that it is necessary to support the Baltic states from the conviction for the alliance and a 
peaceful future.
196
 
It is notable that the Bundestag shares Merkel’s statement and the Governments position 
insofar as the promotion of cooperative structures and the norm of ‘change through 
rapprochement’ do not provide security guarantees as understood in the Ostpolitik but 
the western solidarity is the essential guarantee for security in Europe. This is totally in 
line with the above-mentioned assumption made by Peters that Germany emphasizing 
its traditional transatlantic security policy in the context of the NATO.
197
 However, 
especially MPs from SPD pointed out not to totally abandon the cooperative structures 
towards Russia which in turn goes in line with Kleuters who sees the ‘change through 
rapprochement’ and  the overall Ostpolitik as the right norm to protect the ‘continuity’ 
of the outcome process especially for peace and European unity. The SPD relativizes 
this view only insofar as it recognized the need to distinguish economic and security 
issues and sees them embedded in the corresponding structures which differs from the 
previous understanding of Ostpolitik. Fritz Felgentreu (SPD) who criticized the focus in 
the current debate as one of the first raised the need to reassess Germany foreign and 
security policy. In reference to the felt threat by Russian aggression, he pointed out that 
for a serious security policy in particular it is not the question if Russia wants to attack 
the NATO or not. This assumption is in his view based on a misunderstanding because 
serious security policy does not ask about intentions which might change anyway.
198
 It 
would be more likely about the ability and therefore, the cognition should be: “do we 
have to take note of the fact that Russia is able to attack the Baltic states? We must give 
the answer: yes, this is the case.”199 In his understanding, it is not only because of 
reasonable defence policy but also of historical responsibility that Germany participates 
on the measures by the NATO because “to the good tradition of German Ostpolitik 
includes beside dialogue and trust building always the irrefutable confession to the 
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western alliance.”200 This shows how the foundations of German foreign policy are, in 
Felgentreus view to be discussed again and he as a Social Democrat actually question 
the continuity of Ostpolitik in its current form. 
 
Despite the clear commitment and shared expectations within the Bundestag towards 
western solidarity the repeated emphasis not to neglect cooperative structures underline 
that the German Federal Government was in a convulsive attempt to reconcile the 
competing norms in Baltic policy. As shown, the Bundestag particularly debated about 
the appropriate response to the increasing security concerns in Eastern Europe, the 
deterioration of EU-Russian relations and the participation of the Bundestag in the 
decision making of German involvement in the NATO Very High Readiness Task 
Forces.
 
The Bundestag raised issues of the concept and implementation of the NATO 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Forces and made detailed questions of what position 
the Federal Government will take in the following NATO meetings and to what extent 
and for what purpose the preparations for such Reaction forces are made.
201
 The aim 
was therefore, to include the Bundestag in the decision making for the NATO Reaction 
Forces and demand that the Federal Government will not make any decisions in the 
NATO meeting of Secretary of Defense on 5.2.2015 in Brussels without consulting the 
Bundestag beforehand.
202
 This underlines the Bundestags’ focus on ensuring the 
efficiency and appropriateness of German foreign policy behavior. 
 
The Government stated to aim to balance between the strengthening of the collective 
Defense strategy through the Readiness Action Plan which was agreed at the NATO-
Summit in Wales in September 2014 and the confirmation of the rule based European 
Security architecture including the NATO-Russia Act. As above described the NATO 
Readiness Action Plan was the response to the annexation of Crimea and the increasing 
destabilization of Ukraine. The German Government underlined its commitment in 
advance to the NATO Wales Summit for a credible defense of its NATO partners and 
the persistent offer to maintain the dialogue with Russia which again shows us that the 
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validity of Ostpolitik remain despite the current strong emphasis on alliance 
solidarity.
203
 Besides the continuity for the previous reinsurance measures of the NATO 
like the Air Policing in which Germany as a reliable alliance partner was committed to 
from the very beginning German Federal Government has from their view made 
substantial contributions to the implementation of the ‘adaptation measures’.204 In the 
NATO meeting of Secretary of Defenses in Brussels in February 2015 Germany 
(together with UK, France, Italy, Poland and Spain) agreed to take a leading role for the 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The NATO, so the Government further 
“is claiming to provide a response to the violation of international norms such as the 
NATO-Russia Act by Russia, without questioning the Act itself.”205 
The implementation of additional NATO Force units in the Baltic states and other CEE 
countries is according to the Federal Government not in contradiction to the NATO-
Russian Act and therefore, do not show unreasonable aggression towards Russia. It 
means that the VJTF and the adaptations measures agreed on in the NATO Wales 
Summit are not a permanent deployment of additional NATO troops and totally in line 
with the NATO-Russia Act that agrees on a NATO presence in that region on a rotating 
basis.
206
 This underline Germany’s increased attention how to balance the competing 
norms of change through rapprochement and western solidarity in relation to the Baltic 
states. Beside the efforts in the security cooperation the Action Plan for the Baltic states 
which Steinmeier and his Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Office colleagues agreed on 
was from Germanys point of view a way to balance the need for immediate security 
guarantees by the NATO and the long term goal to seek for dialogue with the Russian 
minorities and by that the further stabilization of the Baltic states domestic 
development. 
As we can see, it means the Federal Government balanced the competing norms of its 
Baltic policy in a time frame where the short time need for responding to the security 
concerns of the Baltic states is followed by the adaptation measures and confirm the 
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norm of solidarity according to Westbindung but in the long term seeks to promote the 
dialogue with Russia and insisting that despite all necessary short term measures the 
contact to Moscow must be constantly searched for. This ensures that Germany would 
act according to its continuity of Ostpolitik without neglecting its Westbindung and 
unrestricted solidarity with its alliance partners. 
All these parliamentary debates show that German Baltic policy was and still is indeed 
struggling with the balancing of the competing foreign policy norms. This confirms 
Hyde-Prices’ claim that Germany, up today, has not found a strategy in its foreign and 
security policy and the public discourse about Germanys role in today’s world politics is 
inadequately defined. This inevitably suggests also that the balancing of competing 
norms in Baltic policy is also an attempt to circumvent such a domestic discussion and 
Germany is reluctant to set its role in Europe and the world, or let it be set by others. 
Also in the understanding of the features of norms by Boekle, we see that while the 
intersubjectivity of both norms was given, the precise definition of appropriate behavior 
was unclear and which norm, in light of current circumstances, is to be prioritized. It 
means that despite the fact that the solidarity with the Baltic states was for the great 
majority of parliamentary fractions out of question it do not mean that the principles of 
Ostpolitik and the norm of ‘change through rapprochement’ has less validity. The 
debate is more likely about in what balance the solidarity and the search for dialogue 
shall be carried out. 
The difficult situation in which German Baltic policy finds itself is temporally solved in 
2016. As mentioned Merkel and several MPs acknowledged the core role of NATO for 
European security and in the plenary debate on 7.7.2016 Merkel underlined this by 
saying  that “the alliance solidarity from the Article 5 of the NATO Treaty is a central 
pillar of the European security architecture.”207 Merkel particularly recalled the 
historical background of the European security architecture after the 1990s and referred 
in particular to the Charta of Paris where all 35 signatory States (including the Soviet 
Union) committed on the CSCE Summit in November 1990 to the “right of States to 
freely arrange their security policies.”208 This includes that each state has the 
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sovereignty and the right of chose the alliance they prefer. The NATO-Russia Act was 
here mentioned only by the way at the end. With regard to the two norms it means that 
when it comes to security Merkel show that Germany is prioritizing the western 
solidarity. Nevertheless, Merkel came to the conclusion that Germanys engagement in 
security cooperation is determined by two central ideas: (1) the Article 5 of the NATO 
Treaty that states that “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”209 and 
(2) the signed NATO-Russia Act from 1997 in which both parties committed “...on the 
basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency, a strong, stable and lasting 
partnership.”210 With that the validity of both foreign policy norms characterizing 
German Baltic policy remain but the weighting is clearly towards the solidarity after 
2014 at least for the foreseeable future. In the long run the dialogue with Russia shall be 
the driving motivation.  
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Conclusion 
 
Based on this study it can be confirmed that the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of 
Crimea caused a change in German Baltic policy which can be explained with the new 
prioritization within the competing foreign policy norms in German Baltic policy. 
Based on constructivist argumentation it was here suggested that norms are likely to 
influence German Baltic policy. In light of the developments of German-Baltic relations 
since 2004 it was argued that the German Baltic policy consists of two competing 
norms. In the understanding of Germany’s continuation of foreign policy one norm is 
based on the Ostpolitik after reunification in 1990 as supported inter alia by Harnisch or 
Randall. Within the principles of Ostpolitik, the driving norm is seen in the change 
through rapprochement where changes are seen to be achieved through economic 
interlocking and cooperative formats. In the early 1990s and beginning of 2000s 
Germany’s consciousness of the historical responsibility for the consequences the Baltic 
states faced after the WWII led to the support of the western integration of the Baltic 
states but still within Ostpolitik. The previous studies about German Baltic policy, 
foremost by Dauchert, outlined therefore, a ‘dilemma’ in the early German-Baltic 
relations. The other norm results from the German Westbindung where the unrestricted 
solidarity within EU and NATO is based on Germanys own western integration. While 
Germany considered the development of European security architecture with the 
inclusion of Russia and thus, was in the beginning skeptical and even refusing the 
NATO enlargement and membership of the Baltic states, it changed after 2004 when 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the NATO. Germany in reference to its policy of 
Wesbindung is a partner and ally of the Baltic states in the same value community and 
ensures its solidarity. Therefore, we recognize that the German Baltic policy since 2004 
consisted besides the norm of ‘change through rapprochement’ according to Ostpolitik  
also of the western solidarity by Westbindung within the NATO and thus, is 
characterized by two competing norms. 
Before going to the findings of this study, it is to be noticed that the defined two 
competing norms are here attributed mostly to historical reasons and emphasize the 
German foreign policy in light of the devastating experiences from the early 20
th
 
Century. Germany’s Westbindung and Ostpolitik are here seen as a result of the negative 
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experiences of former German foreign policy but might also have rational reasons. 
Since the focus was on the influence of the domestic social shared foreign policy norms 
the reference to history and the resulting domestic norms and identity in accordance to 
constructivism seemed most suitable and adequate for this study.  By focusing on the 
impact of the norms of change through rapprochement and western solidarity on few 
aspects of German Baltic policy, namely economic cooperation, diplomacy and security 
cooperation this can be considered as a limitation which is not able to grasp all aspects 
of German-Baltic relation. These aspects are here considered as the most decisive but 
can indeed be understood and defined in a wider range and include elements which are 
not considered here. For example, the very close and indeed frequent cooperation 
between Germany and Baltic states on Federal State level such as by Schleswig-
Holstein or Mecklenburg-West Pomerania which both have a coastline to the Baltic Sea 
are not considered. This might insofar limit this study in a sense that the cooperation 
between these Federal States and the Baltic states can have elements which are not 
emphasized on Federal Government level. The decision here to focus on the Federal 
Government action results from the understanding that foreign policy is considered an 
exclusive matter of the Federal Government. Therefore, this study focuses more on the 
general German foreign policy approach rather than to provide a comprehensive 
presentation of German-Baltic relations. In consequence this exclusive focus on Federal 
Government and Bundestag level limits the sources where individual aspects of 
German-Baltic relations might have come too short. This also means that in the 
evaluation of sources about the general domestic way of thinking in German foreign 
policy the Baltic states are not always particularly mentioned but often considered 
inclusively within issues that directly or indirectly affect the German Baltic policy and 
thus, allow also different set of relevant sources. 
 
For answering the research question ‘what changes we see in German Baltic policy after 
the annexation of Crimea in 2014?’ we see based on the cross-temporal case 
comparison that the German Baltic policy before and after the annexation of Crimea by 
Russia in March 2014 indicate some significant changes in diplomacy and security 
cooperation and indicate that German approach toward the Baltic states experienced a 
change in German foreign policy approach. Before March 2014 the economic 
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cooperation, based on the export rates according to the UN Comtrade Database, show a 
constant increase that a correspondents also with increasing German-Russian economic 
cooperation. In diplomacy Germany’s representatives emphasized the importance of 
Baltic states in EU structures and particularly in the Neighborhood policy and worked 
for the increased dialogue with Russia. In security matter Germany participates since 
2005 in the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission but despite that did not show any active 
participation. After March 2014 the economic cooperation decreased in trade numbers 
and the simultaneous decrease in trade with Russia indicate that the economic sanctions 
towards Russia also influenced the German-Baltic trade. In diplomacy, however, we see 
an increased attention on bilateral relations and the reference to shared history and 
values. Most significant changes we see in security cooperation since 2014 where 
Germany continued in the Air Policing but show in addition very active participation  in 
other NATO exercises such as Saber Strike and Persistent Presence. 
 
This study explains the changes in German Baltic policy since March 2014 by a change 
in the prioritization of German foreign policy norms. Based on the constructivist model 
of logic of appropriateness, where parliamentary debates can be understood as a 
reflection of domestic social opinion the parliamentary debates in the German 
Bundestag were analyzed within the features of norms by Boekle and indicate that the 
Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea led indeed to a clearer distinction between 
the competing norms and clarified the appropriate behavior. Before March 2014 the 
parliamentary debates showed that the Baltic states are mentioned mostly in the context 
of energy cooperation foremost the Nord Stream pipeline and other economic projects 
such as the transshipping in the Baltic Sea Region. This indicates the prioritization of 
economic interlocking and thus, the norm of ‘change through rapprochement’ according 
to Ostpolitik. Since March 2014 the parliamentary debates indicated beside the 
significant quantitative increase in attention towards the Baltic states also the shift of the 
context where they are discussed. Thus, we see that security concerns and the 
unrestricted declaration of solidarity with the Baltic states and the emphasis on the 
value-based community of NATO in light of the Ukraine crisis dominate the debates. 
Based on these finding the research question ‘what guiding foreign policy norm is 
prioritized for the German Baltic policy before and after the annexation of Crimea?’ this 
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study only recognize a temporal change in the prioritization of norms. Whereas the 
German Baltic policy until 2014 is here seen clearly in the prioritization of Ostpolitik 
and the norms of change through rapprochement, the annexation of Crimea caused 
indeed an increasing attention toward the norm of western solidarity and the 
Westbindunn. The validity of Ostpolitik was, however, not questioned. If this immediate 
need for solidarity actually also cause a general change in German Baltic policy is too 
early to say. It is nevertheless a clear finding of this study that German Baltic policy 
experienced a rebalancing of the competing norms in a time axis where the western 
solidarity is prioritized in the short term but the validity of the ‘change through 
rapprochement’ is kept in the long term. If this rebalances in light of the rapid changes 
caused by the Ukraine crisis require in future a sustainable change in the normative 
foundation of German foreign and Baltic policy and in particular in Ostpolitik remains 
to be seen. 
Hyde-Price is right when he say that the need for such debate about the future of 
German Baltic- and overall foreign and security policy therefore, remains. While the 
temporary balancing of the competing norms in Baltic policy is seen in the current 
situation appropriate, the need to discuss the future of the German foreign policy and 
how it is needed to be reassessed was raised by several MPs such as Felgentreu. In light 
of the previous researches about continuity and change in German foreign policy, we 
realize that a German foreign policy has elements of continuation as claimed by 
Harnisch, Peters or Randall but also changes as suggested by Davis and Dombrovski. 
The problem in the previous studies is here seen in the exclusive focus of either 
Ostpolitik or Westbindung. Insofar this study comes to the conclusion that Marshal is 
right when he argues that German foreign and security policy tend to defer key 
decisions about the future. At the same time the historical burden for reconciliation to 
East and West at the same time puts the German foreign policy in a constant balancing. 
This applies also to the German Baltic policy. Ultimately these recent plenary debates in 
the Bundestag indicate that not only the norm prioritization towards Baltic states is to be 
re-evaluated but also if the German foreign policy principles of Ostpolitik and 
Westbindung overall with its basic assumption is still appropriate in contemporary 
politics.  
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Appendices 
 
Graph 1: German Exports to the Baltic states (billion US$/year)
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Graph 2: Baltic states exports to Germany (billion US$/year)
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Graph3: German exports to Russian (billion US$/ year)
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